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Norwegian Strategic Culture:  
A Key to Understanding the Norwegian Approach to the Use of Force 
 
Summary 
 
 
The concept of strategic culture has as its point of departure the fact that despite having many 
options for strategic policies, states consistently seem to prefer a certain type of policy. The way 
that the decision-makers’ perceptions on the use of force shape the formulation of security 
policy, remains a problem that receives the attention of scholars of international relations and 
strategic studies. This study focuses on Norwegian perspectives on the use of force and strategic 
preferences based on current political and military perspectives on the use of force in Norway, 
providing the answer on the main question of the thesis: 
Which strategic perceptions and preferences for the Norwegian security policy can provide an 
understanding of the current Norwegian strategic culture and approach for the use of force? 
 
This thesis is built on an existing study of strategic culture written by Kerry Longhurst, whose 
concept is further refined for this thesis. The framework for analysis is developed by coupling 
the study by Longhurst with a study by Barry Buzan on the security of the state in order to find a 
research model adjusted for the empirical analysis of strategic culture in Norway. This way of 
applying the concept of strategic culture enables close insight into strategic considerations of the 
Norwegian political and military elite as referents of strategic culture. Focusing on a comparison 
of the considerations and perceptions of the political and military elite, my claim is that the 
Norwegian strategic culture lacks coherence. I concluded that there are two substantially 
different strategic cultures exist among political and military elites in Norway. 
 
In this thesis it is argued that deployment of Norwegian forces within the framework of 
international operations and the strengthening of multilateralism is likely to continue to have a 
decisive impact on the thinking on the use of force within the Norwegian political and military 
elite. However, when deciding on priorities within the security and defence policy, contradictory 
influence may to a certain extent appear.  
Different preferences for the use of force between the two elites lead to a concern that one of 
these two considerations may significantly prevail. What would be the result if the priorities and 
perceptions of one of these two sides are not considered to the extent expected? 
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Chapter 1: Introduction – Quest for Approach to Norwegian Perspectives on the Use of Force  
 
 
The concept of strategic culture has as its point of departure the fact that despite having many 
options for strategic policies, states consistently seem to prefer a certain type of policy. The way 
that the decision-makers’ perceptions on the use of force shape the formulation and 
implementation of security policy, remains a problem that receives the attention of both scholars 
and practitioners of international relations and strategic studies. Based on these considerations, I 
have chosen to study the Norwegian perspectives on the use of force and strategic preferences 
affecting the choice of security and defence policies. Norway, as a small power has never had the 
strong tradition in advanced strategic thinking that is so characteristic for big powers.1 Norway’s 
defence has traditionally been structured as an ‘Invasion Defence’, with a focus on national 
defence, in particular attentive to the key geographical position in the immediate vicinity to 
Russia and the long Atlantic coast. The post-Cold War transformation from a territorially based 
national defence to the development of an out-of-area dimension on the use of force in 
Norwegian strategic culture has been challenged by the old invasion defence thinking, at least on 
the military level, and the transformation was therefore relatively slow until the turn of the 20th 
Century. Since then, Norwegian perspectives on the use of force evolved significantly, and today 
Norway is an important contributor with around 800 soldiers deployed abroad.2 This study 
focuses on current perspectives on the use of force in Norway. 
On the conceptual level, inspiration for this study derives from the body of literature in the field 
of security studies and on strategic culture. Kerry Anne Longhurst, whose study of strategic 
culture will be considered in this study, claims that “every collective capable of using or 
threatening to use force has a strategic culture”3. In contrast to some of the more traditional 
approaches to security studies, the strategic culture approach is focused on subjective, nationally 
specific aspects of security and defence policy. Strategic culture can be defined as “[a] 
distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a 
collective (usually a nation)”4. The introduced definition of strategic culture reveals an approach 
that is focused on how collective perceptions, or precisely the perceptions of relevant national 
                                                 
1
 Neumann, Iver B., “Norges handlingsrom og behovet for en overgripende sikkerhetspolitisk strategi”, p. 18, Det sikkerhetspolitiske bibliotek, 
no. 3, Oslo, 2002. 
2
 Jakobsen, Peter V., “Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New model in the making?”, p.145-178, London & New York (Routlege), 
2006. 
3
 Longhurst, K., “The Concept of Strategic Culture”, in Gerhard Kuemmel (ed) Military Sociology: The Richness of the Discipline, p. 282-295, 
Bade Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000. 
4
 Longhurst, K., “Germany and the Use of Force: The evolution of German security policy 1990-2003”, p.17-18, Manchester University Press, 
2004. 
            
  
 
 
           
           
 
 
8 
representatives as referents of strategic culture, on the use of force, play a role in defining 
interests and thus shaping choices of security policy. With this as a point of departure, this paper 
will consider the following question: 
Which strategic perceptions and preferences for the Norwegian security policy can provide an 
understanding of the current Norwegian strategic culture and approach for the use of force? 
 
Beginning with the notion of strategic culture, the aim of this study is to reveal the Norwegian 
preferences for choice of security policy and the perspectives on the use of force. The intention is 
to provide a close insight into the perceptions and strategic considerations of the referents or 
bearers of Norwegian strategic culture. As referents or bearers of Norwegian strategic culture 
this study will consider the political and military elite, which will be considered in detail in 
chapter 3. Once examined, insights into the perceptions and considerations of the referents of 
Norwegian strategic culture will provide the basis for comparison and the uncovering of 
dominant perceptions and considerations. Based on those dominant perceptions and 
considerations, the question of coherency in Norwegian strategic culture with regard to its 
referents will be addressed. The question that remains is how to apply this concept of strategic 
culture to approach the Norwegian strategic perceptions and preferences for security policy and 
the use of force. 
Examining the conceptual foundation of the concept of strategic culture will provide the 
foundation for further developing the research tools required for considering Norwegian 
preferences for security policy and perspectives on the use of force. The following section will 
provide an insight into the conceptual foundations of strategic culture which explanatory and 
research power are still questioned.   
 
1.1 On the Strategic Culture  
 
In quest for inspiration I focused on a recent theoretical model formulated in 2004 by Kerry 
Anne Longhurst5. I consider this model to be useful as a starting point for developing my own 
research model for the empirical study of Norwegian strategic culture.  
Identifying the main components of strategic culture, Longhurst initially considers core values 
that have their origins in the development of the given strategic culture. These core values are 
forming foundational elements and remain the ‘unobservable’ aspects of strategic culture. These 
                                                 
5
 Longhurst, K., “Germany and the Use of Force: The evolution of German security policy 1990-2003”, p.17-18, Manchester University Press, 
2004. 
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core values are contributing to fundamental characteristics of the use of force, which certain 
strategic cultures have.  At the same time, these are contributing to the construction of a national 
identity which leads to a kind of ‘national paradigm’ in strategic matters. Related foundational 
elements and values are highly resilient to change. Extending from these foundational elements 
are the ‘observable’ manifestations of strategic culture, the long-standing policies and practices 
that actively relate and apply to the external environment the substance of the core of the 
strategic culture. These aspects of strategic culture are called regulatory practices. Halfway 
between the foundational elements and regulatory practices are the security policy standpoints 
(Figure 1).6  
 
Figure 1: Longhurst’s strategic culture paradigm 
 
As regulatory practices are related to implementation of decisions made, based on the already 
chosen and formulated security policy, these will not be of interest for the research in this thesis. 
However, challenges related to their implementation will be addressed in the last chapter as 
suggestions for further research. Security policy standpoints, on the other hand, are the 
contemporary, widely accepted interpretations on how to best promote core values through 
policy channels, setting the preferences for security policy choices. The security policy 
standpoints in turn inform the process of defining the strategies and instruments by which 
security policy goals should be achieved. The standpoints thus affect the choice of ‘appropriate 
options’ from the various available decision-options. Moreover, the security policy standpoints 
provide information on how the referents of strategic culture, that is the political and military 
elite, assess and prioritize certain foundational elements.7 Referents of strategic culture cannot 
contradict foundational elements, but they can try to modify regulatory practices to meet their 
                                                 
6
 Longhurst, K., “The Concept of Strategic Culture”, in Gerhard Kuemmel (ed) Military Sociology: The Richness of the Discipline, p. 282-295, 
Bade Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000. 
7
 Longhurst, K., “Germany and the Use of Force: The evolution of German security policy 1990-2003”, p.17-18, Manchester University Press, 
2004. 
Foundational Elements 
Regulatory Practice 
Security Policy Standpoints 
            
  
 
 
           
           
 
 
10 
perceptions and interpretations of the context of the external environment for the foundational 
elements.8 The foundational elements therefore determine the state’s realm of prioritized areas 
and behaviour, a sphere of legitimacy; in short what is ‘normal’ for a state to do. In this sense, 
the relationship of perceptions and interpretations of the external environment to foundational 
elements, through the security policy standpoints, contribute to defining state interests and 
priorities, which in turn determine certain policy preferences and choices, above others by setting 
an agenda that excludes some options whilst including others.9 
This influenced my choice to explore the relationship between perceptions and interpretations of 
the external environment of foundational elements and how the Norwegian political and military 
elite prioritize these foundational elements, in order to reveal Norwegian preferences for security 
policy choice and perspectives on the use of force. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
To capture the essence of Norwegian strategic culture, I will explore the link between the views 
of the political and military elite with regard to the priority given to existing foundational 
elements. This will be examined through the following questions: 
1. How do the Norwegian political elite prioritize foundational elements? 
2. How do the Norwegian military elite prioritize foundational elements? 
 
The question on how the Norwegian political and military elite interpret the external 
environment will be explored through following interrelated questions: 
1. How do the Norwegian political elite interpret the external environment? 
2. How do the Norwegian military elite interpret the external environment? 
 
These different, yet interrelated, questions direct the course of this study. 
 
1.3 Outline of the study 
 
In order to address these questions, I organized this study in the following way. Chapter 1 
introduces the theme of strategic culture as an approach to address the Norwegian perspectives 
                                                 
8
 Longhurst, K., “Germany and the Use of Force: The evolution of German security policy 1990-2003”, p.17-18, Manchester University Press, 
2004.  
9
 Ibid, p.5-24 
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on the use of force and strategic preferences for the security and defence policy choice. Chapter 
2 is built on existing study of strategic culture, particularly of Kerry Longhurst, whose concept is 
further refined for this thesis. This chapter elaborates on the analytical framework developed by 
coupling Longhurst’s study with Barry Buzan’s study on the security of the state, based on his 
classic strategic study “People, States and Fear”, thus developing the research model adjusted 
for the empirical analysis of strategic culture in Norway. Chapter 3 will provide a 
methodological clarification of how this conceptual framework will be applied in the case of 
Norway; who are the referents of strategic culture and which documents and literature represent 
them respectively.  
Chapters 4 and 5 place the empirical products into the frame of analysis by focusing on the 
perspectives of foundational elements and the perception of the external environment examined 
in representative documents of the political and military elite respectively. Chapter 6 presents a 
comparison of the findings on the questions posed in first chapter regarding how the Norwegian 
political and military elite prioritize foundational elements of the state; and how they interpret 
the external environment respectively.  
These findings and comparisons are then used as the basis for the overall summary in chapter 7, 
while the conclusions in chapter 8 considers the findings presented in the preceding chapters in 
light of the thesis’s key questions and concerns. Chapter 8 ends with suggestions for further 
research. 
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Chapter 2: Towards the Framework for the Strategic Culture Analysis 
         
 
 
The intention with this chapter is to develop a framework for analysis of the Norwegian strategic 
culture paradigm. Beginning with the theoretical concept developed by Kerry Longhurst10, this 
chapter will refine it further, through the focus of the research questions presented in chapter 1. 
Furthermore, this chapter will develop the theoretical framework that should be used for the 
research of the foundational elements of the state and how these are prioritized, on one side, and 
the perceptions and interpretations of the external environment on the other. In the quest for a 
theory that can provide the basis for the development of the framework for analysis of strategic 
culture, I paid close attention to Barry Buzan’s classic strategic study “People, States and Fear”. 
Examining security at the state level, Buzan poses the following question: “What is it that 
policy-makers are trying to make secure within the multifaceted phenomenon that we call a 
state?” Unpacking the notion of the state, he examines the contents of the state in relation to the 
idea of national security. These contents of the state provide a solid theoretical base for 
considering and examining foundational elements of the Longhurst model, and for answering the 
first set of research questions from chapter 1. The second set of questions is related to the 
perceptions of the external environment that are influencing security policy formulation. The 
inspiration for the framework to explore the perceptions of the political and military elite, and 
interpretation of the state’s external environment, was found in Barry Buzan’s analysis of the 
threats to the state. According to Buzan, these threats derive from five different sectors: military, 
political, economic, societal and ecological. This analysis will present a clear range of potential 
threats arising from the external environment of the state, as part of the framework for analysis 
of the perceptions of strategic culture referents.11 
 
2.1 The strategic culture concept developed by Longhurst  
 
Providing a characteristic notion of strategic culture approach, Longhurst noted that:  
The ‘unobservable’ aspects of strategic culture are the core values related to the 
foundational elements, giving them basal qualities and characteristics. […] Stemming 
from this core are the actual observable manifestations of the strategic culture - ‘the self-
                                                 
10
 Longhurst, K., “The Concept of Strategic Culture”, in Gerhard Kuemmel (ed) Military Sociology: The Richness of the Discipline, p. 282-295, 
Bade Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000. 
11
 Buzan, B., “People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, p. 112-145, TJ International 
Ltd., Padstow, Cornwall, 1991. 
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regulating policies and practices’ which give active meaning to the foundational elements 
by relating and promoting them to the external environment.12  
 
This distinction between the unobservable and observable components of the strategic culture as 
a starting point for the development of research concept for strategic culture is important. This is 
because not all of the factors examined by different scholars of strategic culture, like ideas, 
values, norms, identity, behaviour etc, are equally suitable for scientific research. Longhurst 
further points the researcher towards observable manifestations of the strategic culture - ‘policies 
and practices’ which give active meaning to the foundational elements by relating them to the 
external environment. Furthermore, if an observable manifestation of strategic culture can be 
found in policies which give active meaning to the foundational elements by relating them to the 
external environment, I would argue that exploring the level of priority given to the foundational 
elements by the political and military elite will provide an active meaning to foundational 
elements. On the other side, exploring the interpretation of the external environment from a 
political and military elite perspective, together with perspectives on the foundational elements, 
provides a solid base for the research design. These two aspects will be further refined through 
Barry Buzan’s analysis of the national security issue in which I found the inspiration for 
developing a research model that can examine the relationship between the perceptions of the 
state’s political/military elite on the external environment and the active meaning given to the 
foundational elements examining how perceptions are prioritized. 
 
 2.2 Explaining the National Security  
 
It will be useful here to define the concept of national security, before moving on to consider the 
foundational elements and threat perception. For the purpose of this study, national security will 
be understood as defined by Wæver: 
One can view ‘security’ as that which in language theory called a speech act […] it is 
the utterance itself that is the act […] By saying ‘security’ a state-representative 
moves the particular case into the specific area; claiming a special right to use the 
means necessary to block this development.13 
 
                                                 
12
 Longhurst, K., “The Concept of Strategic Culture”, in Gerhard Kuemmel (ed) Military Sociology: The Richness of the Discipline, p. 282-295, 
Bade Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000. 
13
 Wæver O. in Buzan, B., “People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, p.17, TJ 
International Ltd., Padstow, Cornwall, 1991. 
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This definition of security, among many others, offers useful insight because it stresses that once 
something is considered a security problem by the government, it automatically legitimizes the 
use of ‘necessary means’. As pointed out above when setting out Longhurst’s model, 
considerations related to foundational elements determines the state’s sphere of legitimacy, in 
short what is ‘normal’ for state to do in situations when their security is questioned. In the 
following sections I will clarify what is meant by foundational elements of the state and the need 
to protect these from the above mentioned five sectors of threats that may arise from the external 
environment. 
 
 2.3 What refers to Foundational Elements of the State? 
 
As mentioned earlier, this question can be answered by unravelling the notion of the state and its 
constitutive parts related to the idea of national security. Suggesting both metaphysical and 
concrete manifestations of the state as a composition of territory, polity and society, Buzan has 
as his starting point the contrasts between the individual person and the state.14 This contrast 
provides a clue as to why the abstract side together with the physical side of the state is so 
important to understanding state security. States are vulnerable to physical damage and 
deprivation, but the state appears to be much less closely connected with its ‘body’ or physical 
element than is the case with individuals.15 Unlike individuals, states can survive a temporary 
loss of their territory, for instance when governments in exile continue to receive widespread 
international and domestic support.16 This leads to the conclusion that, although states depend on 
their physical element, i.e. their territory, statehood is more an idea held in common by a group 
of people, than it is a physical organism. Due to this difference between the nature of individual 
and state, national security, as opposed to individual security, is much more varied and 
complex.17 It provides a far more varied, fragmented and potentially contradicting range of 
security objects than does the more integrated structure of the individual. By conclusion, Buzan 
suggests that the complex issue of national security can be perceived and examined through a 
simple descriptive model formed on the basis of the huge diversity of ideas about the state. This 
                                                 
14
 Buzan, B., “People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, p.57-69, TJ International Ltd., 
Padstow, Cornwall, 1991. 
15
 Ibid, p.57-69. 
16
 Ibid, p.57-69. 
17
 Ibid, p.57-69. 
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model presents a distinction between the idea, the institutional expression and the physical base 
of the state (table 2.1). 18  
 
 
 
 
 
These three components of the state, suggested by Buzan, will for the purposes of the research 
model applied in this study are considered to be the foundational elements of the state.  
The idea of the state is the most abstract component of the model, but also the most central. The 
two main sources for the idea of the state are to be found in the nation and in ideologies of state 
organisation. Buzan defined the notion of nation as a large group of people sharing the same 
cultural, and possibly the same ethnic or racial, heritage.19 As nations are the product of closely 
shared history, they normally constitute the majority population of some core territory. If the 
territories of the nation and the state coincide, it is possible to look for the purpose of the state in 
the protection and expression of an independently existing cultural entity: the nation would 
define much of the relationship between state and society.20 These can organized in accordance 
with some fairly general principles, like democracy or Islam, or some more specific doctrines 
like republicanism or communism. Many varieties of political, economic, religious and social 
ideology can serve as a foundation of a state and will be closely connected to the state’s 
institutional structures.21 These ideologies of state organisation can potentially be threatened, or 
even distorted, corrupted and eventually undermined by contact with other ideas.22 Even national 
                                                 
18
 Buzan B., “People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, p.57-69, TJ International Ltd., 
Padstow, Cornwall, 1991. 
19
 Ibid, p.69-82. 
20
 Ibid, p.69-82. 
21
 Ibid, p.69-82. 
22
 Ibid, p.69-82. 
The institutional 
expression of the 
state 
The physical base 
of the state 
Figure 2.1: The Foundational Elements of the state 
The idea of 
the state 
            
  
 
 
           
           
 
 
16 
cultures are vulnerable to this, as could be illustrated on a small scale by the French sensitivity to 
the infiltration of the French language by English words and usages. 
 
The institutions of the state comprise the entire machinery of government, including its 
executive, legislative, administrative and judicial bodies, and the laws, procedures and norms by 
which they operate. Compared to the idea of the state, state institutions are more visible as 
objects of national security and more vulnerable to physical threats, due to its physical existence. 
However, the crucial element for understanding national security, as Buzan noted, is the 
distinction between states with serious domestic security problems and those whose primary 
security concerns are external.23 Internal dimensions of threats refer to the domestic institutional 
stability and the socio-political cohesion between government and the society. These internal 
threats will not be of particular concern for the research in this study. With regard to the analysis 
of threat perception to institutions from an international perspective (external environment), 
where governments could be perfectly legitimate target in the game of nations, this will be 
considered through the lenses of Longhurst’s model. 
  
The physical base of the state comprises its population and territory, including all of the natural 
resources and man-made wealth contained within its borders. It is the most concrete of the three 
components in the model, and consequently the easiest to discuss as an object of security.24 Due 
to its relatively concrete character, the physical base is also the area in which states share the 
most similarities in relation to security, in contrast to the ideas and institutions of the state. The 
threats to the state’s physical base, population or territory, are of a mutual kind to all states 
because of the similar physical quality of the objects involved. Threats to physical objects are 
necessarily more direct and obvious in seize or damage than are threats to more amorphous 
objects like ideas and institutions.25 Since the state ultimately rests on its physical base, the 
protection of territory and population must count as fundamental national security concern.  
As posited in the introducing part of this chapter, these components of the state provide a solid 
analytical base for considering and examining foundational elements from the Longhurst’s 
model and for providing answers to the first set of research questions presented in chapter 1 
(Table 2.2). 
 
                                                 
23
 Buzan B., “People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, p.102, TJ International Ltd., 
Padstow, Cornwall, 1991. 
24
 Ibid, p.91. 
25
 Ibid, p.91. 
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Foundational Elements 
                       Source            
     Elements 
 
The Idea of the State   
The Institutions of the 
State 
  
The Physical Base of the 
State 
  
 
Table 2.2 presents the model that illustrate relative distribution of political and military 
considerations on foundational elements  
 
2.3 How can the concept of external environment be interpreted? 
 
Now, when the blueprint for foundational elements is defined, an approach for interpreting the 
way in which decision makers’ perceptions influence security policy formulation and 
implementation must be found, based on Longhurst’s strategic culture model. Longhurst points 
towards observable manifestations of the strategic culture, policies and practices, which give 
active meaning to the foundational elements by relating them to the external environment. This 
aspect further influenced my quest for an appropriate approach to studying Norwegian strategic 
preferences on the use of force and security and defence policy choices; an approach based on 
examining the active meaning given to the foundational elements by relating them to observable 
perception of the external environment. In developing the framework to explore the perceptions 
of the political and military elite, and interpretation of the state’s external environment, I found 
the inspiration in Barry Buzan’s above mentioned analysis of the threats to the state coming from 
five different sectors.26 This analysis presents a clear range of potential national security issues, 
or more precisely, potential threats perceived from the external environment of the state. These 
security issues, or potential threats perceived, arise from and stretch across the military, political, 
economic, societal and ecological sectors (table 2.3).27 
 
                                                 
26
 Buzan B., “People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, p.112-145, TJ International 
Ltd., Padstow, Cornwall, 1991. 
27
 Ibid, p.112-145. 
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Threats from the External Environment 
 
Military sector 
 
Political sector 
 
Economic sector 
 
Societal sector 
 
Ecological sector 
 
Table 2.3 Illustrates sectors of threat from the external environment related to Barry Buzan’s 
suggested analytical framework based on threat sectors.  
 
Perceptions and interpretations of the external environment, examined through these five sectors, 
together with perspectives on the foundational elements, develops the framework for analysing 
the Norwegian strategic preferences for the use of force and for the security and defence policy. 
This framework presents at the same time, the lenses through which referents of strategic culture, 
or more precisely the strategic documents that represent them, will be examined in this study. 
This will be expanded upon in the next chapter. Now, I will return to the five sectors. As Buzan 
has stressed, it is worth examining the character of threats within these sectors in order to 
attempts to get a general sense of the ‘legitimate national security agenda’28, or in Longhurst’s 
terms ‘a sphere of legitimacy’29 or what is ‘normal’ than for the state to do. The elaboration that 
follows will provide us with the close insight into sectors from which threats to the state that 
influence the decision-making paradigm in security and defence matters, may be perceived. At 
the same time, it directs further the approach towards the answer on second set of questions from 
chapter 1, related to external environment, and its interpretation by Norwegian political and 
military elite.  
 
2.3.1 Sectors of Threats from the External Environment  
 
Firstly, threats within the military sector may be considered as the form of threat that may 
threaten all the components of the state.30 As such, military threats are usually given the highest 
priority in national security matters because of the use of force involved. The use of force, and in 
that sense even the threat of use of force, implies the willingness to go beyond the line separating 
the regular competitive interplay of political, economic and societal sectors from the more 
                                                 
28
 Buzan B., “People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, p.112-145, TJ International 
Ltd., Padstow, Cornwall, 1991. 
29
 Longhurst, K., “Germany and the Use of Force: The evolution of German security policy 1990-2003”, p.17-18, Manchester University Press, 
2004. 
30
 Buzan B., “People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, p.112-145, TJ International 
Ltd., Padstow, Cornwall, 1991. 
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extreme competition of war. The existence of this line of separation and potential risks to go 
beyond this line, with its potentially dramatic consequences, is the reason why nearly all states 
maintain military forces to counter potential military threats.31  
As political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state, their purpose may range 
from pressuring the government on particular policy, through overthrowing the government or 
disrupting the political fabric of the state so as to weaken it prior to a military attack. Since the 
state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as much feared as military ones. 
Broadly considered, political threats arise from the great diversity of ideas and traditions. In 
terms of ideologies of state organisation, during the past century, liberal-democratic, fascist, 
communist, and more recently Islamic, political ideas have contradicted each other in practice 
just as much as monarchical and republican ideas did in the nineteenth century.32 Specific 
political interventions by one state in the domestic affairs of another deserve most attention in 
this study. Buzan considers that these specific political interventions deserve the label of national 
security, but it remains problematic to draw boundaries between them.33 As this kind of political 
threats may be coupled with threats from the military sector, and considering the Norwegian 
geographical position in the immediate vicinity of Russia, as presented in chapter 1, these 
political threats will be given particular attention due to their relevance for Norway.  
Societal threats can be difficult to separate from political one, as significant external threats on 
the social level amount to attacks on society and national identity, and thus easily fall into the 
political realm. Societal threats are often influenced by an interplay of ideas and communication 
that may produce politically significant societal and cultural threats, as illustrated by the reaction 
of Islamic fundamentalists to the penetration of Western ideas.34 As Norway falls within the 
label of liberal democracy, I do not expect to reveal that such an interplay of ideas and 
communication may be considered as threat to the society in Norway. I expect it to be difficult to 
separate the threats from the societal sector from political ones, in particular with regard to 
threats to society arising from international terrorism, which is the most serious form of 
perceived threats to western societies.  
Economic threats are the most complicated form of threat to deal with within the framework of 
national security, and only occasionally will specific economic threats deserve to be ranked as a 
                                                 
31
 Buzan B., “People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, p.112-145, TJ International 
Ltd., Padstow, Cornwall, 1991. 
32
 Ibid, p.112-145. 
33
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34
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national security problem.35 These threats may be considered within both an internal dimension 
and also an external dimension related to international economic affairs. Ecological threats to 
national security, like military and economic ones, may damage the physical base of the state, 
perhaps to a sufficient extent to threaten its idea and institutions. Traditionally, however, 
ecological threats have been seen as an unpredictable part of the natural conditions of the life, 
and thus more a matter of fate than an issue for the national security agenda.36 On the other hand, 
with the consequences of such natural disasters having the potential of being as vast as, for 
example, the consequences of Tsunami that hit Southeast Asia in 2004, it is to expect that current 
ecological threats are considered almost as serious as the military ones, and that military and 
ecological techniques will play interactively in relations between the states.  
 
  
2.3.2 How to operation threats from the external environment? 
 
The question of when a threat becomes a national security issue depends not just on the type of 
threat, and how the recipient state perceives it, but also on the intensity on which the state 
react.37 Many factors can affect the threat perception intensity in the particular recipient state, but 
as Buzan points out, it is a problem that not all of these factors can be measured or estimated 
accurately. Furthermore, many of the factors frequently occur in complex combinations which 
make the overall weighting of intensity highly problematic, such as the probability of threats 
occurring or the weight of threat consequence and whether or not perceptions of the threat are 
amplified by historical circumstances. As posited earlier, the potential threats stretch across the 
military, political, economic, societal and ecological sectors, as summarised in the Table 2.3.2.  
It presents the model for the research of the perception of the external environment from the 
political and military elite perspectives respectively which will be used for empirical research in 
chapters 4-5.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Buzan B., “People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, p.112-145, TJ International 
Ltd., Padstow, Cornwall, 1991. 
36
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 Perception of Threats from the External Environment 
                       Sources            
     Sectors 
Political Military 
Military   
Political   
Societal   
Economic   
Ecological   
Sum   
 
Table 2.3.2 presents the model illustrating relative distribution of political and military 
considerations of threats from the external environment  
 
2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Theoretical Framework  
 
The presented theoretical framework is based on the strategic culture concept which is developed 
by Kerry Longhurst and further refined and adapted for research of Norway’s strategic culture 
through the Buzan’s approach to studying the national security. To define national security I 
refer to Wæver’s definition which provides an insight into how defining an issue as a security 
problem by the government automatically legitimizes the use of ‘necessary means’. This view 
corresponds with Longhurst’s model and considerations related to foundational elements that 
determine the state’s sphere of legitimacy or what is ‘normal’ for state to do in situations when 
their security is questioned. With regard to the research questions from chapter 1, related to 
considerations of how Norwegian political and military elite prioritize foundational elements of 
the state and how they interpret the external environment, or which issues may pose threats to 
security of foundational elements in Norway, I relied on Buzan’s approach which examines the 
contents of the state, relating these to the idea of national security. This approach provides a 
solid theoretical base for considering and examining the foundational elements from Longhurst’s 
model. The following three component parts of the state, suggested by Buzan, will consider 
being the foundational elements of the state in this study: the idea of the state, the institutional 
expression of the state38 and the physical base of the state. Furthermore, as the basis for the 
                                                 
38
 Further in the text – the institutions of the state, as used in Buzan B., “People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies 
in the Post-Cold War Era”, p.112-145, TJ International Ltd., Padstow, Cornwall, 1991. 
            
  
 
 
           
           
 
 
22 
framework to explore political and military elite perception, and interpretation of the state’s 
external environment, I use an analysis of the threats to the state coming from military, political, 
economic, societal and ecological sectors. This analysis presents a clear range of potential threats 
perceived from the external environment of the state as part of the framework for analysis of 
perceptions of strategic culture referents. Threat assessments of this type lie in the heart of 
security policy.39 The difficulties arise when applying this model on the particular state and 
categorizing its elite’s considerations and perceptions that are sometimes formulated differently. 
Therefore I made the overview in Appendix 1 with examples of categorization related to elite’s 
considerations on foundational elements and perceptions of threats from external environment.   
My concern on the disadvantages of the presented model is that Kerry Longhurst’s approach to 
strategic culture and Barry Buzan’s approach to studying the national security, reflect more 
British views on how to study national security and preferences for use of force and security 
policy and that these views may not correspondent perfectly to the Norwegian approach to use of 
force and national security policy. In particular, this may be due to the specific and relatively 
unique Norwegian combination of historical, geographical, cultural and political history, which I 
think invites a careful interpretation and approach to the Norway’s strategic culture. Again, 
returning back to the theoretical framework, as formulated for the research in this study, I 
consider it to be useful and applicable for uncovering dominant perceptions and considerations 
of the referents of strategic culture. As argues in the introductory chapter, it represents a 
contribution to the conceptual foundation of strategic culture whose explanatory and research 
power is still questioned.  
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 Buzan B., “People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, p.112-145, TJ International 
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3. The Methodological Approach to Strategic Culture Analysis 
 
Done well, the careful analysis of strategic culture could help policy makers establish 
more accurate and empathetic understandings of how different actors perceive the game 
being played […] Done badly it could reinforce stereotypes about the predispositions of 
other states and close off policy alternatives deemed inappropriate for dealing with local 
cultures.40 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the methodological approach I will apply when studying 
strategic culture in the case of Norway, something I found difficult from the very beginning. 
There exists an extensive body of literature on the concept of strategic culture, and I collected 
and read more than 30 articles and books where strategic culture is either discussed or applied 
for research. This survey over the literature on the concept enabled me to choose as a starting 
point a recent study on strategic culture by Kerry Longhurst, as elaborated in chapters 1 and 2. 
Combining this study with Barry Buzan’s classic strategic study “People, States and Fear” in 
order to study the security of the state, enables further theoretical refinement of the concept, 
developing a research model better adjusted for the empirical analysis of strategic culture in 
Norway. The questions how and why I will apply this model through the empirical research will 
be clarified in this chapter through the elaboration on the chosen research method design, data 
collection strategy and data analysis method in following three sections of this chapter. 
 
3.1 Research method  
 
An important part of the development and planning of this research project was the identification 
of whether I will employ a qualitative or quantitative method. Qualitative approaches to data 
collection, analysis, interpretation and report writing differ from the more traditional quantitative 
approaches.41 To answer the questions raised in this thesis I will rely on a qualitative exploratory 
research design as the overall methodological tool for examination in this study.  
As soon as the form of research method was chosen, the next step was to decide on the approach 
to data collection, that is, whether it was to be inductive or deductive. This is one of the first 
problems a researcher must deal with when deciding on a data collection method; should he/she 
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 Johnston, Alastair I., ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture, International Security, 19:4, pp. 33-64, 1995. 
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start from already known theories pointing further towards empirical analysis using a deductive 
approach, or should an inductive approach starting from the empirical data towards theory be 
used. I have chosen to use the deductive approach in this study. A deductive approach starts with 
assumptions, which the researcher then examine through empirical data to test whether these 
assumptions are correct or have to be rejected.42 Main criticisms of the deductive approach are 
related to the risk of the researcher only looking for data that confirms the expected result of 
his/her research.43 Besides, such a choice limits the access to more data related to strategic-level 
decision making on security and defence policy. For this reason, I will rely explicitly on primary 
sources coming from the state institutions which will be further elaborated upon in the following 
third section. 
 
 3.2 Strategy of data collection  
 
As Creswell has suggested, qualitative researchers tend to collect data through examining 
documents, observing behaviour or interviewing participants.44 To decide on way how data 
should be collected, my first step was to clarify who or what were the appropriate referents or 
focus in the study of strategic culture. Studying the debate on the strategic culture concept I 
concluded that it is often a much contested issue. In the heart of the debate among scholars of 
strategic culture were two questions: should one consider only views of elites in the field of 
security and defence; or should the broader public opinion also be subject to analysis? In the 
existing literature I found in general limited discussion of public beliefs or opinion, and where it 
does exist it is generally combined with opinions of the elite. Strategic culture analysis mostly 
focuses on the elites, whether they are purely the military or those in the broader political-
military decision making sphere. My position on the referent of the strategic culture is that 
political and military elite voices within ‘national strategic community’45, as specified by the 
founder of the concept, is relevant, while the broader public sphere is rather considered as the 
general contextual environment. This preference to exploring political and military elites, rather 
then broader public opinion, is due to the fact that strategic cultural literature does not consider 
broader public opinions as necessary. Furthermore, I generally found public opinions difficult to 
conceptualize and to be of less importance to security policy-making. The conditionally negative 
                                                 
42
 Jacobsen, Dag I., “Hvordan gjennomføre undersøkelser?”, p.23, HøyskoleForlaget, Kristiansand, 2005. My translation.  
43
 Ibid, p.23. My translation. 
44
 Creswell, John W. “Research Design – Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed method approaches”, p.175, SAGE Publications, California, 2008. 
45
 Snyder, Jack L., “The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for limited Nuclear Operations”, p.8, RAND Report R21254-AF, Santa Monica, 
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side of this choice is the fact that I, as foreign student on the Norwegian Defence University 
College, can hardly expect to be able to do a comprehensive survey of the opinions of or arrange 
interviews with the representatives of the political and military elite in Norway. This limitation 
directed my focus on examining documents applying intensive data analysis. The question which 
then followed was which documents could be seen as representing the political and military elite 
respectively, creating the basis for security and defence policy making. I consider it as necessary 
to use primary sources, namely official statements in the form of institutional documents from 
relevant bodies, from the political and military side respectively, to ensure the accuracy of the 
security policy standpoints that arise from a reflection on foundational elements and perception 
of external environment from both national elites. This enabled qualitative validity, and at the 
same time the need for ensured credibility was fulfilled by using primary sources.46  
 
 3.3 Which documents have to be analyzed? 
 
To find an answer to this question I examined first the political decision making process related 
to the security and defence policy. Political control of the Norwegian Armed Forces is exercised 
through a division of power and cooperation between the Parliament and the Government. The 
Parliament adopts documents that represent Norwegian security and defence policy while it is 
the Government which has the highest executive authority responsible for military and civil 
preparedness in peacetime and for the command of all aspects of total defence in time of crisis 
and war.47 When it comes to the cases when foreign and security policy have to be directed, 
Parliamentary Commissions are consulted prior to decisions being taken together with the 
relevant state institutions. In the case of security and defence policy, or precisely, when 
Parliamentary White Papers (Storingetsproposisjon) on long-term planning of security and 
defence policy has to be agreed upon and adopted contributions in the form of reports as are 
sought from the political and military sides respectively. The government therefore appoints a 
Forsvarspolitisk utvalg48, or Defence Commission, consisting of political representatives from 
all parties in Parliament and independent security policy experts, to prepare a report as their 
contribution to the Parliament’s long-term planning on security and defence policy. When it 
comes to the military side, the strategic leadership of the of the Armed Forces include the 
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Forsvarssjef49, that is, the Chief of Defence, and his/her strategic functions within the Ministry 
of Defence, collocated with the Defence Staff.50 The Minister of Defence heads the Norwegian 
Ministry of Defence and has political responsibility for the activities of the Armed Forces. The 
Chief of Defence is the country’s highest ranking military official and is the principal adviser to 
the Government and the Defence Minister on military questions as well as exercising full 
command of Norwegian Armed Forces.51 
Based on this analysis, an answer to the question of which documents have to be analysed can be 
sought. Exploring further the process that constitutes the basis for the Parliamentary debates and 
decision making on the national document directing national security and defence policy, I found 
that two reports, or documents, represented the main suggestions from the political and military 
elite, and at the same time, the foundational basis for Parliamentary debate and decision on the 
national strategic document that directs security and defence policy. The document by the 
Defence Commission, ”NOU 2007:15, Et styrket forsvar, Utredning fra forsvarspolitisk utvalg 
ved kongelig resolusjon 18. august 2006. Avgitt til Forsvarsdepartementet 31. oktober 2007”52 
will represent the primary ‘political’ source in this thesis, while the primary military source will 
be the ”Forsvarssjefens forsvarsstudie 2007 – sluttraport (FS07)”53, a document written by the 
Chief of Defence. Both reports were published in same year, 2007. As these two served as the 
basis for the Parliamentary White Paper, it was logical to explore these two documents in the 
search for political and military interpretations of the external environment and the order of 
priority of foundational elements of Norway.  
 
 3.3.1 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
 
The process of data analysis in this study involves interpreting texts from different sources, to 
which the same analytical framework from chapter 2 was applied. The analysis of these two 
sources, based on the presented analytical model, provided a broad insight into when the 
meanings given to foundational elements and perceptions of the external environment are 
considered. Having as a starting point John Stuart Mills three basic criteria for comparative 
analysis; the most similar systems design (MSSD), the most different systems design and the 
method of concomitant variation, I chose to use in this study - the most similar systems design 
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(MSSD)54. This comparative analysis is applied to the two abovementioned documents. As these 
two documents are having the same purpose, that is, to form the basis for Parliamentary debate 
and decision making on the national document guiding national security and defence policy, I 
found it relevant to compare findings from them applying MSSD.  Findings from this 
comparative analysis are presented in Chapter 6. The information gathered this way can not 
easily be measured or displayed in graphs or formulas, whereas one of the primary strengths of 
quantitative research applied in this research is that it aims at drawing conclusions by explaining 
and comparing the considerations and perceptions from the two sources. However, in addition to 
this broad insight into considerations and perceptions from sources, further inspiration for the 
additional analysis in depth of the findings was found in presenting and comparing absolute 
numbers and percentage of relative distribution of considerations and perceptions expressed as 
numerical illustrations of findings55.  
  
3.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Analytical Tools 
 
As suggested earlier, strategic culture forms the all encompassing contextual environment within 
which and out of which a state’s security policy is formulated and executed.56 Certainly, as an all 
encompassing environment it contains a rich basis of additional themes that could be explored, 
but as mentioned earlier, not all of these are suitable for scientific research. Thus, the first 
disadvantage comes from the overall requirement for scientific certainty for this master thesis, 
something I had in my mind when developing the tool for analysis Norwegian strategic culture. 
Introducing this analytical model I was aware that it is a form of trade off between the scientific 
requirement on one side, and the richness of the world of ideas, values, norms, identity, 
behaviour, mind-set, emotions, beliefs etc, sometimes considered by scholars of strategic culture, 
on the other side. 
The advantage of this analytical model is that the considerations of the presented elements 
forming the strategic culture can be researched and compared. Furthermore, another advantage is 
the use of official documents representing institutionally expressed political and military views 
on the security and defence matters in Norway, thereby preventing any questions on their 
accuracy or validity. 
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Chapter 4: How do the Norwegian political elite prioritize foundational elements and perceive 
threats to them? 
 
4.1 Order of priority for foundational elements 
 
4.1.1 The Idea of the State 
 
The starting point for the analysis of considerations for foundational elements in the 
Parliamentary Defence Policy Commission’s ‘ A Strengthened Defence’ are the Norwegian 
values and interests that have to be secured in light of the timeless demand for security for the 
state and society “[…] and not just in short term military threat picture”.57 This refers to a “[…] 
future full of insecurity”58 in which Norwegian values and interests have to be secured. 
Norway’s sovereignty and sovereign rights, together with Norway’s national interests, is the 
basis of the fundamental right of Norway as a state, which is based on International Law. 
According to the Defence Commission, this will be protected by Armed Forces if necessary.59 
Peace, security and ensuring of Norwegian interests by reducing the possibilities for excessive 
pressure against Norway or even the use of force against Norway, define the basis for the role of 
the Armed Forces according to Defence Commission. This approach paves two perceived ways 
for maintaining Norway’s sovereignty. Firstly, Norway defends its territorial integrity alone, and 
secondly, Norway being defended through the support of Allied forces. The main aim in both 
ways is to prevent war or the escalation of conflict. According to the Defence Commission, 
ensuring Norwegian peace and freedom is a basic value. In addition to maintaining Norwegian 
state sovereignty, the Armed Forces are expected to contribute to peaceful development in the 
world where human rights have to be respected. Seeing Norway as a small state, the Defence 
Commission emphasises the interest and necessity for maintaining and strengthening respect for 
International Law. 
Defence Commission therefore considers active contribution to the maintenance and 
development of the International Law to be of fundamental interest to Norway. Further, the 
Defence Commission considers the strengthening of cooperation between states in all respects to 
be of importance, particularly within the framework of the United Nations collective security 
system and NATO obligations, and with neighbouring and other states. Promoting cooperation 
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between states in international organizations, both global and regional, is perceived as 
particularly necessary and important for both a peaceful development of international relations 
and the functioning and development of the International Law. The strong Norwegian interest for 
this rule-bound conduct of international relations on one side, and its relation to interstate 
security perspective on the other, has been clearly expressed: “International Law, in particularly 
the UN Charter, constitute the framework for civilized communication between states, setting 
strong limits for the lawful use of military force and creating frames for states’ obligations and 
rights”.60 It is a Norwegian interest to promote an international society founded and maintained 
through the international relations based on cooperation. The Defence Commission’s reason for 
this focus on promoting the international society is its perceived contribution to interstate 
confidence building, stability and predictability, and as a result - security.  
In that respect, the most important means by which Norway, as a minor power, can prevent 
negative international development in which power dominates international relations, is to 
work strongly on the strengthening of the interstate cooperation in the framework of 
international organizations: “Relevant, efficient and respected international organizations, in 
particular the UN and regional organizations, represent the best foundation for achieving the 
aim of a world system based on International Law and the principled of the UN Charter”.61 
Beside the importance for small states security, as a concrete example of the importance of UN 
and International Law framework, the Defence Commission emphasises the Norwegian right to 
explore resources on the continental shelf and in the sea waters outside Norwegian territorial 
waters as established by the International Agreement.  
The sharing of the burden of participating in international operations among nations is 
considered by the Defence Commission to be of particular importance to Norway and its Armed 
Forces, anchoring at the same time the use of military force in the UN Charter and a common 
approach of the International Community. Further, the Defence Commission goes on to consider 
the importance of increased UN credibility and the development of UN capability with regard to 
a comprehensive approach to solving conflicts through international operations, resulting in 
more emphasis given to participation in UN-led operations from most Western countries, 
including Norway. Beside participation in international operations and peace arbitration in 
conflicts, the Defence Commission considers the long term efforts for global disarmament to be 
important and sees it as a good example of Norwegian contribution.62  
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The Defence Commission emphasises that Norway gives high priority to UN’s superior and 
global role in the efforts of the international society towards world wide peace and development. 
Further, the Defence Commission clarifies that the Norwegian policy is not simply based on 
Norwegian interests to promote a more peaceful world, but also a desire to promote fundamental 
values for UN efforts, in particular a universal respect for human rights.63 The Defence 
Commission emphasises the obligation of Norway, together with other states, to stop conflicts 
and to relieve humanitarian emergencies, as clearly expressed in the UN principle of 
Responsibility to Protect.64 
Ever since its establishment in 1949, the Defence Commission has perceived NATO as being of 
fundamental importance for Norway’s security and defence policy. The Defence Commission 
does not consider the future of NATO as given, but rather as being dependant on the support of 
its member states which makes the Alliance relevant and credible. This has a high priority in 
Norwegian interests. To relate the importance of the role of NATO for Norway to the framework 
of the UN, the Defence Commission stresses that “[…] while the UN stands as central for peace, 
security and development of the world in general, NATO represents a concrete framework for 
the defence of Norway against a military attack”65. The Defence Commission emphasises in 
particular the importance for small states such as Norway to participate in the NATO 
transatlantic forum, where protection of the interests of the member countries is discussed and 
there is a possibility to contribute to the decision making.66 Contact with USA and large 
European powers are also considered by the Defence Commission to be very important for 
presenting and discussing Norwegian interests and attitudes.67 Although Norway is not a member 
of the EU, the influence of the EU in Norwegian security policy has grown significantly in the 
last years, particularly due to the common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The 
establishment of EU Battle Groups is considered to be of central importance for cooperation.68 
This Norwegian contribution and participation to the security and defence dimension of 
cooperation with the EU is directed through the cooperation with Sweden, Finland and Estonia 
and European Defence Agency (EDA).69 
                                                 
63
 Parliamentary Defence Policy Commission, “A Strengthened Defence”, p.15, Oslo, 2007. 
64
 Ibid, p.16. 
65
 Ibid, p. 15. My translation. 
66
 Ibid, p.15. 
67
 Ibid, p.15. 
68
 Ibid, p.14. 
69
 Ibid, p.15. 
  
31         
  
 
 
            
          
 
 
 
As stressed by the Defence Commission, an important objective for Norway is to continuously 
seek attention in High North area among allies in NATO and among the cooperation partners.70 
In addition to active Norwegian diplomacy among allies and partners, the Defence Commission 
emphasises the importance of cooperation with Russia in both a bilateral and international 
framework.71 
Norway and Russia have, as the Commission sees it, a number of mutual interests in 
the northern areas, both economic and ecological. The possibilities are therefore 
good for improving bilateral cooperation. Further improving of bilateral 
cooperation, which has been developed during the last years, should be an important 
objective for Norway. Good cooperation based on mutual interests adds to confidence 
building and is thus important for aspects of security policy.72 
 
The Defence Commission emphasises a good integration policy in Norway as precondition for 
an improved security policy.73 Respect for human rights and individual human security in the 
Norwegian society are considered as fundamental, and have to be protected both in the state and 
world wide.74 
 
4.1.2 The Institutions of the State 
 
Institutions in Norway are based on the founding values of democracy, law and order in the state, 
justice in legal system, the welfare state, human rights and security for every citizen in 
Norway.75 The Norwegian state institutions are related to state sovereignty the maintaining of 
which includes the deterrence of potential opponents that could try to impose pressure on the 
Norwegian government’s policy choices. NATO represents the central framework for Norway’s 
security in the case of larger scale use of force or military attack against Norway.76 
The Defence Commission gives particular attention to the sovereignty and functioning of 
Norwegian jurisdiction in the northern parts of Norway. It is stressed that Norway relies on a 
predictable and responsible policy in the High North Area, as precondition for a viable 
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development of the area characterised by stability and ensured security.77 It also includes the 
fulfilment of Norway’s obligations as coastal state, besides management and exploration of 
resources.78 Additionally, the possibility of a warmer Arctic climate could enable easier access to 
oil, natural gas and minerals in this area, thereby increasing the competition among the states in 
“the area where borders and jurisdictional conditions are unclear”79, particularly in Fishery 
protection zone (Fiskevernsonen) in the Barents Region. The unclear borders between Norway 
and Russia, the military importance of the High North area for Russia, and the presence of 
valuable fish and petrol resources, important to the Norwegian economy, both within and outside 
of Norwegian territory, are open questions that complicate the jurisdictional conditions that 
remain a Norwegian interest.80 Besides the unclear state borders, including the complex question 
of the Barents Region, the Defence Commission adds an even more challenging question of the 
far northerly group of islands around Svalbard. Norway’s management over fishing resources in 
this area is based in the Svalbard Treaty (Svalbardtraktaten)81 rather than in Norwegian 
legislation, and is subject to the disagreements of some countries: “Spain, Island and Great 
Britain, in addition to Russia, are countries that clearly expressed its disagreement with Norway 
in the Svalbard question”.82 It is estimated that significant oil and natural gas resources exists on 
the sea bed in the area of Svalbard and could at some time in the future be reached, and the 
Defence Commission are expecting additional pressures on Norway in that regard.83 Although 
NATO represents the central framework for Norway’s security and territorial integrity, the 
potentially changed conditions in Svalbard area may have the impact on the way Norwegian 
authority in this area would be considered or supported, which again could impact on the extent 
of Alliance involvement in the area.84 Therefore, the Defence Commission considers real time 
evaluation of the security situation by surveillance and intelligence activities, to be necessary for 
decision making process for Norwegian authorities and thus be among the priorities for defence 
policy.85   
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4.1.3 The Physical Base of the State 
 
As suggested earlier, the physical base of the state consists of its population and territory, 
including all of the natural resources and man-made wealth contained within its borders. It is by 
far the most concrete of the three components the state in the model and its content is the easiest 
to identify as objects of security. The Defence Commission stresses the importance of security 
for the state and the Norwegian population, including nationals outside the Norwegian borders 
who may be exposed to the harassment or assault or be unable carry out self-defence.86 Global 
challenges, namely the spreading of weapons of mass destruction87 and international terrorism, 
could have an impact on Norwegian security, and most of these challenges are related to societal 
security. The safety of the civilian population, as well as functions and infrastructure of central 
society is perceived by the Defence Commission as contents of the security for society in 
situation when state existence is threaten.88 Further, the right to use natural resources like oil, 
natural gas and fish, based on the UN Law on the Sea Regime, together with Norwegian 
territorial integrity and physical protection of national borders, objects, resources and ecological 
management, is emphasises as being necessary for maintaining the welfare society, and not just 
its physical protection.89 This is predominantly related to the High North area that represents an 
area with strategic importance in the global context.90 The area is particularly politically 
sensitive due to the estimates existence of the large amounts of petroleum resources under the 
sea in the High North area, particularly in the Barents Region where the exact location of the 
national border between Norway and Russia is still questioned. The Norwegian territorial 
integrity in this area depends to a large extent on an agreement between Norway and Russia on 
the demarcation of both states’ economic zones in the Barents Region, something which has yet 
to be achieved.91 This open territorial question is pragmatically solved with Gray Zone 
Agreement from 1977, which deals with the exploration of fish resources in this area and which 
prevents bilateral problems. However, the border dispute may prove to be of a different weight 
and dimension if significant oil and natural gas resources are to be found in the future.92 Besides 
this complex territorial question at the Barents Sea, the Defence Commission considers as even 
more challenging the question of the abovementioned islands around Svalbard. Preserving fish 
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resources and preventing the destruction of the nature in the Norwegian sea territory and in the 
High North area, is of high importance for the state economy, and any challenge to utilization of 
these resources and danger to the environment could have consequences on state security.93 
Besides the relation to the UN framework, the Defence Commission relates the physical base of 
Norway to the maintenance of the sovereignty, where “the Armed Forces will maintain state 
sovereignty through monitoring and prevention of violations against Norway”.94 When it comes 
to the territorial defence, the Defence Commission presents a more complex picture. For the 
defence of Norwegian territory from a military attack, NATO represents concrete framework 
with its collective defence principle.95 But according to the Defence Commission, most of the 
potential incidents related to Norway’s physical existence, is expected to be related to the 
question over the exploration of the resources in the High North area. These incidents may 
potentially escalate into a crises or conflict of a scale that may require the involvement of NATO 
and a collective defence of Norway. The Defence Commission stresses, however, the possibility 
of the potential crises being of such a scale that it is “to big for Norway, but too small for 
NATO”. As a result, the Defence Commission insists on the need for national capabilities for 
crisis management in Norway’s close area that can take control over incidents that physically 
challenge Norway’s territorial integrity or threatens to escalate into a conflict in High North area, 
where involvement NATO collective defence principle may be questioned.96 The NATO 
principle of collective defence remains the central framework for Norway’s territorial defence 
together with Norwegian Armed Forces.97  High priority is given to the situations where human 
lives may be endangered by catastrophes or disasters. In these cases all necessary available state 
resources are expected to be engaged in search and rescue actions both on land or at sea. This 
view on the safety for the population includes possible cases of terrorist attacks abroad and 
catastrophes in foreign countries, where Norwegian citizens may be involved.98  
 
4.1.4 Summary of Foundational Elements   
 
Analysing the absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of how frequently 
foundational elements were considered by the Defence Commission, within the presented research 
results from ‘A Strengthened Defence’, indicates interesting differences. The idea of the state is 
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the most often used among the three elements, while the institutions of the state is the least used 
element (Table 4.1).  
 
Order of Priority for Foundational Elements 
                       Source            
     Elements 
Defence Committee’s ‘A Strengthened Defence’ (N=201) 
 
The Idea of the State 138 69 % 
The Institutions of the 
State 
23 11 % 
The Physical Base of the 
State 
40 20 % 
 
Table 4.1 Illustrates the absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of how many 
times foundational elements are considered in the Parliamentary Defence Policy Commission’s ‘A 
Strengthened Defence’ (N=201). 
 
Analysing the Defence Commission’s considerations of foundational elements, the value of living 
in peace, welfare state, freedom and further development of democracy seems fundamental for 
Norwegian interest and the focus point within its identity and the idea of the state as foundational 
element. Besides these values, high importance is given to international side of the idea of the 
state, where the Norway’s strong interests are emphasised through the promotion of International 
Law and the contribution to active maintaining and further development of the international legal 
system, including the protection of human rights. As will be presented in the next part of this 
chapter, many of the challenges for Norway that the Defence Commission identifies are related to 
the question of collective for international society, thereby implying that Norway as a small state, 
together with other small states, is more dependent on international cooperation than the larger 
powers. In this regard, the Defence Commission pinpoints as Norwegian interests the need for 
credible, respected and efficient international organizations like the UN and regional organizations 
which represents foundations for a world order based on respect for human rights and the 
principles of the UN Charter. Together with the Norwegian interest in an efficient UN and to 
contributing to UN credibility, the Defence Commission considers membership in NATO and 
cooperation with EU in the area of security and defence as important elements of the framework 
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36 
for Norwegian security and defence. When analysing bilateral perspectives considered by the 
Defence Commission, cooperation with Russia is mentioned most, five times more than with 
USA. This is where Norway’s strong interest in efficient multilateralism should be directed, as 
recommended by the Defence Commission, in active support of constructive engagement by 
Russia in the international society, which would contribute to making it easier to solve the 
bilateral questions that remain open between Norway and Russia, and to inspire to improved 
confidence between the two states.  
With regard to institutions of the state as foundational element, this is something the Defence 
Commission awards less attention in quantitative terms. Besides ensuring the functioning of the 
law and order in the state, justice in the legal system and functioning of the society, the Defence 
Commission gives particular attention to the functioning of jurisdiction in northern parts of 
Norway, namely the High North area. The state and its institutional policy, as they suggest, should 
be predictable and responsible in the High North Area, as a main precondition for a viable 
development of this area, with stability and ensured security. The regional and international 
perspective is often used, as questions related to High North area are to some extent 
internationalised, particularly with regard to the question of national authority of the group of 
islands around Svalbard and in Barents Region. The physical base of the state, the Defence 
Commission predominantly relates to territorial integrity and Norway’s population, including 
nationals outside Norway’s borders who may be exposed to the harassment or assault or unable to 
defend themselves. Particular attention is given to security matters in the High North area and to 
the utilization and control of state resources based on national sovereignty and International Law. 
 
4.2 Perception of Threats from the External Environment  
 
4.2.1 Threats from the Military Sector 
 
The Defence Commission emphasise that the current threat picture has changed as a 
consequence of globalization, large powers political rivalry, climate change, migration, energy 
security, weak states and violent extremism. Perception of all these threats, according to the 
Defence Commission, should influence the defining of and decision making on Norwegian 
security and defence policy.99 The Defence Commission’s perception of military threats on the 
global scale is dominantly related to low intensity conflicts in which Norwegian Armed Forces 
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may participate. Elaborating how these conflicts could be manifested, the Defence Commission 
presume a broad spectrum of forms of conflict, depending on what factors the actors involved 
consider to be their objectives and rationale.100 “Strategies of asymmetric warfare that could be 
used in intrastate conflicts by non-state actors, particularly when military forces of parties 
involved in conflict lack both quality and size”.101 These strategies, the Defence Commission 
considers, could be based on the innovative use of technology, terror against civil populations, 
threats for use of WMD and on limited, but repeated attacks on soldiers of international forces 
involved in dealing with conflicts or in stabilization operation.102 The Defence Commission 
considers there to be many armed conflicts, and that the risk of conflict cannot be excluded even 
in Europe: “[…] although the importance of the use of military force is significantly reduced in 
the part of the world where Norway is situated, conflicts on the Balkan showed that the risk of 
war can not be excluded once and for all”.103 Real military threats on the regional level are not 
excluded and the Defence Commission relates these to the increased Russian military activities 
in the Barents Region, and the potential misunderstandings or lack of mutual confidence that can 
lead to a limited military crisis on the border with Russia.104 Direct military challenges are 
related to the Barents region and neighbouring Russia. “Borders between the two states remain 
unclear in this region which is military important and sensitive for Russia.”105 The consequences 
for Norway will depend to certain extent on Russian policy towards neighbouring countries on 
the one side, and their increasing military activities in this border area on the other, as assessed 
by the Defence Commission. This includes increased risk of incidents related to the exploration 
of resources and to military activities in this area.106 Increased military activities in Barents 
region may result with incidents and even crises, based on misunderstandings or politically 
driven challenges, which in the worst case may develop into military threats against Norway. 
These threats are considered by the Defence Commission to be potential limited air, sea or land 
attacks on Norway.107  
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4.2.2 Threats from the Political Sector 
 
As previously argued, political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state and 
their purpose may range from pressuring the government on particular policy to overthrowing 
the government or weakening the political fabric of the state prior to a military attack. Since the 
state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as much feared as military ones.108 
Starting off from a broader perspective, the Defence Commission assesses the potential world 
development, where the consequences of the politics of rivalry between a few strong regional big 
powers may lead to a diminishing of the role of international organizations and international 
cooperation among states.109 The Defence Commission lists the rising Russian ambitions to 
challenge US dominance as being most interesting to Norway, but stressing also that a world 
with a limited number of regional big powers may not necessarily present a problem for 
international society, as long as they pursue a responsible policy of cooperation.110 If not, the 
importance and efficiency of multilateralism may be diminished, like in the case of the UN 
Security Council that may be paralysed with just one permanent member having a strongly 
opposing attitude and the possible implications this may have on the functioning of the UN as 
whole.111 The Defence Commission considers it as very negative for Norway, if a development 
towards a multi-polar state system results in a weakening of International Law and cooperation 
between states in international organizations.112 Threats with possible global influence, as 
considered by the Defence Commission, are falling within the threats from political sector, 
although due their nature these have impact on all five threat sectors, naming threats coming 
from weak states and intrastate conflicts or migrations caused by global warming.113 The 
spreading of conflicts or destabilizing of states that surround conflict areas is perceived by the 
Defence Commission as a potential threat to both regional and global security.114 Stressing that 
the future of NATO is not given, but as already mentioned being dependant on its member states 
support, the Defence Commission expresses concerns over internal misunderstandings between 
NATO states, related to sharing of burdens in international operation such as Afghanistan and 
the lack of will to provide sufficient soldiers for the NATO Response Force. This is considered 
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as a challenge to NATO’s institutional strength, something which is very important and relevant 
for Norway whose defence in the case of full scale war depends on the NATO principle of 
collective defence.115 To some extent, NATO’s institutional strength is related to challenges for 
Norway in High North area. The Defence Commission estimates these as possible challenges to 
Norwegian authority and rights for resources management in this area.116  For instance, a 
potentially serious challenge would be a situation in which Norway could not or would not want 
to deal with challenges in High North area through NATO because of the different attitudes 
among some Alliance members on Norway’s rights and status in the High North area.117  
Norway’s sovereignty and sovereign rights in maintaining the jurisdiction according to Norwegian 
laws on Norway’s territory may be challenged by another state.118 Challenges to Norwegian 
jurisdiction, the potentially self-asserting Russian foreign policy and the military importance of 
High North area for Russia, is stressed by the Defence Commission as being of continual 
importance for Norwegian security policy.119 
 
4.2.4 Threats from the Societal Sector 
 
Most of the threats to society or human security may be related to dangers posed from 
international terrorism. The Defence Commissions among others refers to “New York, Bali, 
Madrid, Sharm el-Sheikh, Beslan and London as just some of the most mention places struck by 
terrorism in few last years”.120 In relation with international terrorism and some terrorist groups 
that are showing desire for large casualties being caused by their attacks, the Defence Commission 
stresses the clear danger of possibly new and even more serious forms of terrorism that could be 
related to spreading and use of WMD.121  
Stressing that maintaining the welfare state is of high importance for the Norwegian society, the 
Defence Commission considers physical threats to objects and infrastructure, and threats to 
managing resources and environment as being threats to foundations of the Norway’s welfare.122 
The Defence Commission includes here the danger of computer attacks on information systems of 
critical importance for society.123  
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4.2.4 Threats from the Economic Sector 
 
Potential threats coming from the economic sectors of global importance may have an impact on 
Norway both directly and indirectly. The politics of rivalry between the big powers may lead to a 
multi-polar state system and a situation where a limited number of strong regional big powers 
show little interest in international cooperation. Growing competition over limited resources may 
have a negative direction with the possible result of worsening the situation in the Middle East 
region or of producing states losers of such global competition something which may lead to the 
temptation to use drastic actions in an attempt at acquiring the resources needed to secure own 
economies.124 Energy resources are required for developing modern societies and allowing 
economies to grow, in Asia as in the western world. The Defence Commission estimates that the 
development of international energy trade, in particular the high demand for energy resources and 
focus on energy security, could have consequences for Norway as exporter of energy resources.125 
Firstly, challenges to Norway’s economy may be caused by external demands for reduction of 
prices for energy resources, and secondly, these challenges could be related to international 
pressure for extended exploration for new energy resources which may cause pressure on 
Norway’s claim for exploration and managing petroleum resources around Svalbard.126 Due to the 
importance of energy supplies, the Defence Commission considers Norwegian energy 
infrastructure to be a possible valuable target for international terrorism, challenging Norway as 
exporter of energy resources.127 With relation to energy economy, the Defence Commission 
stresses that rising state expenses due to the aging population on one side, and the potential 
situation of declining incomes from petroleum industry on the other, may present a challenge in 
the long term for upholding a balance of state and public expenses in Norway, with the impact this 
may have on the development of the defence sector.128  
 
4.2.5 Threats from the Ecological Sector 
 
A majority of ecological threats identified and assessed by the Defence Commission have either 
global or regional character, but to significant extent a collective character. However, the priority 
given to threats in the Arctic, High North and Barents region is mainly due to their direct potential 
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consequences on Norway’s security policy. These threats are perceived as possibly very 
important, with the potentially vast consequences on state security, spanning through all other four 
sectors that may play interactive role in relations with other states, like with for example, 
neighbouring Russia. Considering the long term perspective, the Defence Commission estimates 
both direct and indirect potential impacts of ecological threats on Norwegian security policy, first 
and foremost as consequence of climate change.129 Starting their assessment from the global 
perspective, the Defence Commission considers that global climate change represents a most 
serious challenge for the world in the 21st Century130 that may lead to significant changes in living 
conditions in some parts of the world, causing large scale global migration.131 Climate change thus 
can have security consequences, causing international conflicts based on a struggle for limited 
resources like water, food, more habitable territories, minerals and energy resources. This can 
cause destabilization of whole regions like Africa, Middle East and parts of Asia, due to being 
areas which may be seriously impacted by temperature rises, something which would result in 
serious consequences for global security.132 This fact influences Norway’s efforts in support of the 
international society that is facing concerns over global climate change.133  
Ecological threats perceived from regional perspective are predominantly related to High North 
and Arctic areas where significant ice melting may lead to the establishing of new strategically 
important sea transport routes in the Arctic sea. The shipping traffic which could multiply in that 
case will represent further political challenges for Norway, but the Defence Commission considers 
it as a significant ecological challenge. Temperatures rising again, may lead to increased 
competition for the access and right to oil, natural gas and minerals exploration in High North and 
Arctic areas.134 Within ecological challenges the Defence Commission also considers potential 
crises situations that threaten human security on the national level requiring rescue actions, or 
disasters and catastrophes on the Norwegian territory and abroad where Norwegian citizens are 
involved. The Defence Commission also sees the destruction of nature and its consequences on 
fish resources in the Norwegian seas as perceived ecological threats to the Norwegian territory. 
Considering the importance of fishing resources for the Norwegian economy, the Defence 
Commission concludes that threats to these resources will have consequences on security policy. 
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If these challenges are coming from actors supported by other state, it will represent challenge to 
Norway’s sovereign rights and will be considered a challenge to national security.135  
 
4.2.6 Summary of Threat Perception  
 
The analysis of absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution in relation to the research 
of threat perception, indicates that the Defence Commission considers military, political and 
societal threats relatively equally often, while ecological threats are considered less often. 
Economic threats are most rarely considered compared to the other four threat sectors (Table 4.2). 
 
Perception of Threats from External Environment 
                       Source            
     Sectors 
Defence Commission’s ‘A Strengthened Defence’ (N=136) 
Military 34    25 % 
Political 35 26 % 
Societal 31 23 % 
Economic 10 7 % 
Ecological 26 19 % 
 
Table 4.2 Illustrates absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of considered threats 
from the external environment in Parliamentary Defence Policy Commission’s ‘A Strengthened 
Defence’ (N=136). 
 
The analysis of the Defence Commission’s threat perception from the five sectors set out has its 
starting point the current changed threat picture that should influence the way in which Norwegian 
security and defence policy is defined. The changed threat perception is mainly the consequences 
of: globalization, big powers rivalry politics, climate change, migration, energy security, weak 
states and violent extremism. In the military threats sector, perception of military threats on the 
global scale is related to low intensity conflicts in which Norwegian Armed Forces are and may 
participate, where limited, but repeated attacks on soldiers of international forces could occur 
during operations. The potential for direct military threats is related to bordering Russia, 
considering possible incidents and crisis that may eventually lead to limited air, sea or land attacks 
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on Norway. Most of the threats from the political sector are related to the importance and 
efficiency of multilateralism for Norway, and the potential situations in which it may be 
diminished, or even paralysed. As Norwegian rights to energy resources in the parts of High North 
area are based on International Law, a weakening of global multilateralism may have 
consequences for Norway’s sovereign rights. Besides the challenges to Norwegian jurisdiction, a 
potentially self-asserting Russian foreign policy and the military importance of High North area 
for Russia where state borders remain unclear are stressed by the Defence Commission as of being 
of continued importance for Norwegian security policy. In this regard, a possible weakening of the 
institutional strength of NATO presents additional challenges for Norway. The Defence 
Commission is of the view that societal threats may be distinguished between those related to 
maintaining the welfare state (threatening to, e.g. Norwegian management of resources and 
environment) and threats of a more collective nature for the international society, related to 
international terrorism. Economic threats to Norway are linked to international energy trade, 
particularly to growing demand for energy resources and the focus on energy security with 
potential consequences for Norway as exporter of energy resources. This includes energy 
infrastructure becoming potentially valuable targets for international terrorism, due to the global 
importance of energy supplies, making Norway vulnerable as an exporter of energy resources. The 
majority of ecological threats identified and assessed by the Defence Commission have to a 
significant extent a collective character for the international society. Looking at the long term 
perspectives, the Defence Commission estimates direct and indirect potential consequences and 
impacts of global climate change and pollution, which may contribute to mass migrations and 
international conflicts based on a renewed struggle for limited resources. The Defence 
Commission names the High North area and the Barents region as areas where ecological threats 
may have more direct impact on Norway’s security policy in the case of significant ice melting on 
Arctic. Such a situation may lead to multiplying of the shipping traffic in the Arctic Sea, with its 
political, military and ecological challenges this may involve. Potential crisis requiring rescue 
actions due to threats to human security, such as disasters and catastrophes on the Norwegian 
territory and abroad when Norwegian citizens are involved, are given particular attention.  
  
4.3 The Bottom Line 
 
The absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution indicates that the Defence 
Commission considered each of the foundational elements in ‘A Strengthened Defence’ at 
different frequency. The idea of the state is the most often referred to among three elements, and 
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the institutions of the state are the least used element. An analysis of threat perception suggests 
that the Defence Commission considers political, military and societal external threats relatively 
equally often, while ecologic threats less often considered. Finally, economic threats are most 
rarely considered, in comparison to the other four threat sectors. 
The Defence Commission’s consideration of foundational elements reflects the value placed on 
living in peace, the welfare state, of freedom and further development of democracy as 
foundational for Norwegian interests and identity. Particularly high importance is placed on the 
international side of the idea of the state where respect for the UN Charter and International Law, 
protection of human rights, constructive interstate cooperation and active development of 
international society are of important Norwegian interest. The Defence Commission considers 
membership in NATO and cooperation with the EU in the security and defence area to be a 
framework for security and defence in Norway. Through the strong and often clearly expressed 
interest in efficient multilateralism, the Defence Commission reflects on the bilateral perspective, 
where active support to Russian constructive engagement in international society is considered to 
be a contribution to a more workable solution of the bilateral issues between Norway and Russia. 
Emphasising the functioning of law and order in the state, justice in legal system and the 
functioning of the society, the Defence Commission gives particular attention to the effective 
functioning of Norwegian jurisdiction in High North area. Concerning the physical base of the 
state, the Defence Commission focuses on the territorial integrity and the population, including 
Norwegian citizens outside the state territory that may be exposed to the harassment or assault or 
be unable for defend themselves. Again, particular attention is given to the security in the High 
North area and to the utilization and control of state resources, based on national sovereignty and 
International Law. 
The analysis of the Defence Commission’s threat perception from the external environment 
illustrates the attention given to global challenges as consequence of globalization, the politics of 
rivalry between the big powers, climate change, migration, energy security, weak states and 
violent extremism, with their influence on threat perception from five sectors set out. The Defence 
Commission perceives that threats from the military sector have to be expected in low intensity 
conflicts and international operations where Norwegian contingencies participate and will be 
deployed. Direct potential military threats is related to neighbouring Russia and the worst case 
scenario that may lead to a limited military crises in the air, sea or on the land, particularly in the 
area bordering to Russia. Threats from political sector are related to the importance and efficiency 
of multilateralism for Norway and the potential situations in which multilateralism may be 
diminished. This may result in challenges to Norway’s sovereignty and institutional authority, 
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particularly in combination with potentially self-asserting Russian foreign policy. The Defence 
Commission’s perception of societal threats can be distinguished between those related to 
maintaining the welfare state on the one hand, and threats of more collective nature for 
international society related to international terrorism on the other. 
Economic threats may arise from international energy trade, particularly due to the growing 
demand for energy resources and the focus on energy security with its potential negative 
implications this may have for Norway as an exporter of energy resources. International terrorism 
that may perceive Norwegian energy infrastructure as valuable target represents a further potential 
threat for Norway. Finally, ecological threats identified and assessed by the Defence Commission 
have to a significant extent a collective character for the international society as global climate 
change and pollution may contribute to mass migrations and international conflicts based on the 
struggle for limited resources. Significant ice melting on Arctic, may, due to potential multiplying 
of the shipping traffic in the Arctic Sea, including High North area and Barents region, with the 
corresponding political and ecological challenges, have a direct impact on Norway’s security 
policy. Crisis situations that could require rescue actions, such as in the case of disasters and 
catastrophes on the Norwegian territory and abroad, are considered by the Defence Commission as 
falling under the ecological sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
  
 
 
           
           
 
 
46 
Chapter 5: How do the Norwegian military elite prioritize foundational elements and perceive 
threats to them? 
 
5.1 Order of priority for foundational elements 
 
5.1.1 The Idea of the State 
 
 
An attempt to trace the purpose of distinguishing the notion of the idea of the state from its 
physical base in the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s “Defence Study 2007”136, reveals difficulties 
in separating the idea of the state from the functional logic of the governing institutions of the 
state. The Defence Study 07 bases its consideration on projected security challenges to 
Norwegian sovereignty related to the military-strategic situation in Norway and the surrounding 
areas.137 The projected defence capabilities in Defence Study 07 thus present ambitions to 
conduct tasks that Norway as sovereign state should be able to carry out without support from 
allies, until the outbreak of the full scale war.138 The Defence Study 07 refers to rational and 
realistic levels of ambitions when considering the protection of national sovereignty. As 
important tasks that Norway has to be able to perform without allies, Defence Study 07 lists the 
following: ensuring independent national capability for situational awareness of Norwegian 
territory and the surrounding areas, and ensuring executive authority and sovereignty with 
capability for crises management in critical conflict situation.139 This includes the protection of 
Norwegian interests until such as time when the situation escalates into a full scale conflict at 
which time it is expected that allies will be involved in collective defence through NATO.140 The 
security challenges that Norway is facing are particularly complex in the High North area where 
for reasons set out in the previous chapter, responses have to be planned without expecting 
Allied support unless there is an outbreak of a full scale war against Norway.141 Besides the day-
to-day activities related to the defence of national sovereignty and Norwegian interests, the 
Defence Study 07 considers deployment and cooperation of Norwegian Armed Forces with 
Allied soldiers in the international framework in tasks both on Norwegian territories and in 
international operations abroad.142 
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5.1.2 The Institutions of the State 
 
 
The Defence Study 07 focuses on ensuring that the execution of governing regimes is done in 
accordance with Norwegian interests and international agreements. In the case of a full scale 
conflict, it is considered in the Defence Study 07 that the government’s ability to ensure certain 
political influence for Allied operation in defence of Norwegian territories will depend on the 
Norwegian military contribution to such an operation.143 In that respect, the Defence Study 07 
suggests that the Norwegian military capabilities have to ensure that any state, willing to use 
military force against Norway to advance its political interests towards Norway, is unable to 
achieve its goals without using force of such a level of gravity that Allied forces will be deployed 
in collective defence of Norway in accordance with NATO principles, even if their national 
interests do not correspond with the Norwegian interests.144 Having as its starting point an 
assessment of the conditions for the political situation in the part of Europe where Norway is 
situated as starting point, the Defence Study 07 considers that most of security challenges to 
Norwegian authority are related to High North area.145 Without considering these challenges in a 
traditional territorial invasion manner, the Defence Study 07 estimates that the means of other 
state in advancing its interests against Norway may include limited use of force to impose 
pressure on the Norwegian government to change political course.146 The primary role of 
Norwegian Armed Forces in this case is defined by the Defence Study 07 as ensuring the 
freedom of action of the national government on the Norwegian territory or the surrounding area. 
The Defence Study 07 then goes on to considered Norwegian participation and military 
contribution to international operations led by NATO, the UN or other organizations.147 Here is 
Norwegian obligation as a member of the NATO Alliance under the framework of collective self 
defence specifically mentioned as an important premise for the further development of 
Norwegian Armed Forces.148 The capacity required for the Norwegian Armed Forces to carry 
out their day-to-day engagement must be sufficient to ensure territorial surveillance and 
maintaining of Norwegian authority, as well as ensuring sovereignty with capacity for crisis 
management on Norway’s territory and in close surrounding area.149 The task of maintaining 
government authority is primarily directed at on the Norwegian land territory. At sea, presence in 
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territorial waters is to a large extent focusing at controlling sea resources and the border towards 
Russia.150  
 
5.1.3 The Physical Base of the State 
 
Although the Defence Study 07 to a large extent excludes the possibility of a military invasion of 
Norway in traditional sense, it does not exclude potential security challenges to Norwegian 
territories which may evolve into conflict with potential to escalate in full scale war.151 Potential 
scenarios that could represent challenges to Norwegian security policy developed and elaborated 
for Defence Study 07 are predominantly related to High North area, as well as to international 
operations abroad, in which Norwegian forces are participating.152 These challenges may include 
different forms of violations of the Norwegian air, sea and land territories. The notion of territory 
in this context is considered to be an arena for demonstrations of force where the choice of 
military targets not necessarily reflects traditional approaches in evaluating strategic targets. For 
instance, the assessment of the strategic value of a military target on Norwegian territory could 
be based on its ability to achieve the political goals of Norway’s opponents. This approach 
includes limited land operations in the form of raids where occupied territory could be used for 
demonstration of force with the aim of achieving political intentions and goals.153 The Defence 
Study 07 does not exclude asymmetrical threats against population and national objects of high 
priority in Norway, as a consequence of international terrorism and non-state actors’ actions.154 
The defence structure proposed by the Defence Study 07 thus emphasise the maintenance of 
capabilities for defence against limited military attacks on Norwegian territory, capabilities to 
face the asymmetric threats that may be directed towards some of prioritized objects or important 
infrastructure, and finally to support the civilian society on Norwegian territory based on the 
modernized concept of total defence.155 
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5.1.4 Summary Foundational Elements   
 
The analysis of absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution in the research results 
indicates that the institutions of the state as a foundational element is considered most, while the 
idea of the state is the least used element (Table 5.1).  
 
Order of Priority for Foundational Elements 
                       Source            
     Elements 
Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 2007’ (N=58) 
The Idea of the State 14 25 % 
The Institutions of the 
State 
24 40 % 
The Physical Base of the 
State 
20 35 % 
 
Table 5.1 Illustrates absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of how many times 
foundational elements are considered in Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 2007’ 
(N=58). 
 
The analysis of considerations in Defence Study 07 on the idea of the state are to some extent 
difficult to separate from physical base and functional logic of state’s governing institutions. 
Most of the considerations related to sovereignty and territorial integrity are closely related to 
military-strategic situation in the area surrounding Norway, in particular the High North area, 
including the protection of Norwegian interests below the threshold of armed conflict against 
Norway. In the case of an outbreak of war against Norway, Norway’s sovereignty relies on the 
expectations of the principle of collective self defence inherent in NATO being activated, with 
Norwegian Armed Forces as integral part of Alliance. For these expectations to be met, the 
Defence Study 07 emphasises the need for deployment and cooperation of Norwegian Armed 
Forces with Allied soldiers in the international framework in tasks both in Norwegian area and 
also participation and military contribution to international operations abroad led by NATO, the 
UN or other organizations.  
With regard to the question of institutions of the state as foundational element, the Defence 
Study 07 is focused on governing regimes in line with Norwegian interests and international 
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agreements. In particular, considerable emphasis is placed on the importance of the 
government’s ability for political manoeuvre and the need to ensure certain political influence 
for Allied operation in the defence of Norwegian territories in the case of a full scale conflict. 
Such a conflict may be produced by other state which in advancing its interest against Norway 
may include limited use of force to impose additional pressure on government to change its 
political course. In the Defence Study 07 it is suggested that military capabilities have to ensure 
that any state, willing to use military force to advance its political interests against Norway, is 
unable to achieve its goals without using sufficient amounts of force activate the NATO 
Alliance’s principle collective defence for the benefit of Norway, even if the national interests of 
some allies do not correspond with the Norwegian interests.  
Although the risk of traditional military invasion of Norwegian territory is excluded in the 
Defence Study 07, it focuses on the possibility of limited violent episodes on Norwegian territory 
which may escalate into a full scale war against Norway. The strategic value of military targets 
on Norwegian territory is assessed as on the basis of their contribution to the achievement of the 
political goals of Norway’s opponents, including limited operations in the form of raids where 
Norwegian territory could be used for the demonstration of force. Most of such potential 
scenarios are related to High North area, however, international operations in which Norway is 
participating abroad are also considered. The adequate defence structure proposed by Defence 
Study 07 is therefore focused on the following: defence against limited military attack on 
Norwegian territory and asymmetric threat towards certain objects or important infrastructure, 
support to the civilian society on Norwegian territory based on the modernized concept of total 
defence and finally participation in international operations abroad. 
 
5.2 Perception of Threats from the External Environment 
 
5.2.1 Threats from the Military Sector 
 
The starting point for the Defence Study 07 perceptions of threats arising from the military sector 
is the domestic setting that has its premise the ensured national capabilities for handling threats 
to state sovereignty and authority, including crises management in critical conflict situations. 
The capacities of Norwegian Armed Forces to contribute to a potential Allied operation of 
collective defence in Norway in the case of full scale military threat to Norwegian territory and 
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Norwegian interests are also considered.156 The Defence Study 07 considers as particularly 
important the possible military threats which relate to the participation in international operations 
outside Norway.157 In addition, to counter potential asymmetric threats to Norway from 
international terrorism and non-state actors, the Defence Study 07 considers as important the 
further development of military capacities.158 The main set of military threats is related to a 
potential limited conflict with another state that will not have the scope of a military invasion, so 
characteristic for Cold War period. The potential use of force in that case is considered as far 
more limited in relation to time, space and number of soldiers.159 It is expected to be: 
A conflict with another state today may occur as a result of smaller, regional political 
disputes on open questions. It is likely to be isolated and limited use of force to 
pressure the government to change its course in the political struggle on an important 
question or to comply with some concrete demand.160 
 
A potential area for military challenges to Norwegian territories is expected to be the High North 
area.161 The notion of territory will, in that case, represent an arena for the demonstration of force 
where the choice of military targets will not necessarily reflect the strategic value as it would 
under the more traditional approach. More precisely, according to the Defence Study 07, these 
operations may include: 
[…] violations of air space, confrontation between Navy vessels in international 
sea waters, aircraft or missile attack on important military or economic 
infrastructure, or in more extreme cases, demonstration of force in the form of 
raids with soldiers from sea or air occupying limited areas of Norwegian or 
international territory, until the political intention is fulfilled.162 
 
The Defence Study 07 considers it more probable that such demonstration of force is directed 
against sea and air territory than Norwegian land territory. It is expected that Norwegian Armed 
Forces will be able to handle these military threats alone, until the crises escalates into full scale 
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conflict which will then be handled within the framework of NATO, the UN or other 
organizations.163 
 
5.2.2 Threats from the Political Sector 
 
Perception of threats from the political sector is to a large extent related to military threats, or 
more precisely, most political threats are expected to have its implications through different 
forms of military activities against Norwegian interests.164 Having as its starting point the 
estimation of power and political conditions in north-western Europe, the Defence Study 07 
concludes that most challenges to the Norwegian national security and state authority will be 
related to High North area.165 Almost all potential military threats are considered as being the 
result of another state attempting to achieve its political goals. The main reason for this is the 
consideration that the consequence of any use of military force against Norway will be the 
reflection of the political objectives of the other state. The scope and type of military operation is 
thus considered to be in direct relation and proportional to level of political ambitions, 
manifested as demonstrations of power with the aim to impose political pressure on the 
government.166 Perceiving challenges from a global perspective, the Defence Study 07 considers 
conflicts in other parts of the world, naming the case of Afghanistan as example, to some extent 
to have a possible impact on the collective nature of security, and particularly to Norway, even if 
an adequate and politically coordinated comprehensive approach is applied to such a complex 
conflicts.167 
 
5.2.3 Threats from the Societal Sector 
 
Threats to society and human security dealt with in the Defence Study 07 are either related to 
asymmetrical threats resulting from international terrorism or other non-state actors’ activities, or 
to computer attacks on information and communication systems.168  
Analysing further the threats to information and communication systems, it is concluded in 
Defence Study 07 that these threats target the vulnerabilities of modern society such as 
telecommunications and information infrastructure, and have many advantages for aggressor in 
                                                 
163
 Norwegian Chief of Defence: “Defence Study 2007”, p.6, Defence Staff, Oslo, 2007. 
164
 Ibid, p.6. 
165
 Ibid, p.6. 
166
 Ibid, p.6. 
167
 Ibid, p.6.
  
53         
  
 
 
            
          
 
 
 
comparison to the more traditionally physical forms of attack. It is perceived that these attacks 
may be very efficient and dangerous for functioning of society.169 The Defence Study 07 does 
not, however, consider the protection against this type of threats to be a military task.170 
As part of the broader picture of treats to the security of society, the Defence Study 07 considers 
the impact of serious criminal activities, crisis in society, and certain terrorist activities on the 
important objects and infrastructure. In protecting the society from these forms of threats the 
Norwegian Armed Forces will support police efforts through engagement of Home Guard – 
Heimevernet (HV).171 
 
5.2.4 Threats from the Economic Sector 
 
Threats from the economic sector are, similarly to societal threats, related to the possibilities of 
causing a complete collapse of vital social functions like food supply, energy supply, payment 
systems etc. without physical destruction of state infrastructure.172 It is, however, considered that 
these functions may, as in the case of other society’s functions, be paralysed through the 
manipulation or destruction of information and control systems on which they are dependant.173  
 
5.2.5 Threats from the Ecological Sector 
 
Although I tried to identify at least indirect consideration of threats and consequences that falls 
within ecological sector, I have to conclude that Defence Study 07 does not elaborate on threats 
that can be expected from ecological sector. 
 
5.2.6 Summary of Threat Perception 
 
The analysis of absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution in the result of the 
research into perceptions of threat in the Defence Study 07 shows interesting differences with 
regard to the way threats from the five sectors are considered. Compared to threats in the political, 
societal and economic sectors, threats in the military sector are considered to a much larger extent. 
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On the other hand, threats from ecological sector are not considered in Defence Study 07 at all 
(Table 5.2). 
 
Perception of Threats from External Environment 
                       Source            
     Sectors 
Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 2007’ (N=61) 
Military   41 67 % 
Political 10 16 % 
Societal 10 16 % 
Economic 1 1 % 
Ecological 0 0 % 
Sum 100 % 100 % 
 
Table 5.2 Illustrates absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of the references in 
the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 2007’ to threats from the external environment 
(N=61). 
 
An analysis of the threat perception from five different sectors in the Defence Study 07 shows that 
the Study mainly focuses on considerations of military threats to state sovereignty and authority, 
crisis management in critical conflict situations and the potential for escalation into full scale war 
against Norway. The forms of perceived military threats are demonstrations of force and possible 
violations of Norwegian air, sea and land territory including a potential limited scale occupation of 
parts of Norwegian territory. These military threats are perceived as closely related to the 
achievement of the opponent’s political goals, such as changing the government’s political course 
or pressure to comply with some concrete demand. Areas of the Norwegian territory where the 
potential for military threats most prevailing, is the High North area, which could, in the case of 
confrontation, represent an arena for a demonstration of force in which the chosen military targets 
not necessarily will reflect the traditional approach to strategic target evaluation, but rather be 
reflecting political intentions. Military threats to Norwegian contingencies in international 
operations abroad are given particular attention in Defence Study 07, namely in the case of 
Norwegian involvement in armed hostilities in Afghanistan where the largest Norwegian 
contingency abroad is based. Most of the political threats considered in the Defence Study 07 are 
expected to be interrelated with different forms of military activities against Norwegian interests. 
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As presented above when considering threats from the military sector, most of the potential 
military threats are considered as being in result of political threats and political agendas by other 
states. In the Defence Study 07, these threats are expected to be potentially followed by 
demonstrations of power with the aim to impose political pressure on the government, something 
which makes the political threats difficult to separate from the considerations of perceived military 
threats in Defence Study 07.  
Societal threats in Defence Study 07 are related to either asymmetrical threat arising from 
international terrorism or other non-state actors’ activities, or to attacks on information and 
communication systems. Threats to information and communication systems are considered in 
light of the vulnerabilities of modern society caused by the high level dependence on 
telecommunications and information infrastructure. The impact of serious criminal activities, 
potential crisis in society, and particularly terrorist activities towards important objects and 
infrastructure present main consideration of treats to the security of society in the broader picture 
considered by Defence Study 07. Threats from economic sector is dealt with in a similar manner 
to those arising from the societal sector, that is through possible crises that may be caused by a 
complete collapse in vital social and financial functions like food supply, energy supply, 
payment system etc. without the physical destruction of state infrastructure. The destruction of 
vital information systems or manipulation of control systems on which society is dependant may 
potentially paralyse all of these functions. Ecological threats are not elaborated in the Defence 
Study 07. 
 
5.3 The Bottom Line 
 
The analysis of absolute numbers and relative terms percentage of the results of the research of 
Defence Study 07 indicates that institutions of the state and execution of the state authority as 
foundational element is the most often considered element among the three. The idea of the state is 
the most rarely considered element. The analysis shows also a difference in the way the threats 
coming from five sectors are considered. Threats from the military sector are the most often 
considered, comparing with political, societal and economic threats sectors. On the other side, 
threats from ecological sector are not considered in Defence Study 07. 
The Defence Study 07 closely relates sovereignty and territorial integrity considerations to the 
military strategic situation in Norway and the surrounding areas, particularly in the High North 
area. The Study excludes considerations of traditional military invasion on Norwegian territory, 
but considers as possible episodes involving limited operations demonstrating force on parts of 
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Norwegian territory. The estimated goal of the enemy could be to advance its interests against 
Norway, including limited use of force to assert additional pressure on the government to change 
its political course, something which can even escalate into a full scale war. Considering 
Norway’s defence capabilities, it is thus claimed in Defence Study 07 that any state, willing to 
use military force to advance its political interests against Norway, must not be allowed to 
achieve its goals without using sufficient amounts of force enable Norway to expect Allied 
forces to contribute to the collective defence of Norway, even if the national interests of some 
allies do not correspond to those of Norway. 
The analysis of considerations of threat perception revealed that most of the perceived military 
threats were the result of political threats and political achievement potentially intended by other 
states. The Defence Study 07 expects military threats to be manifested through limited 
demonstrations of power aiming to assert political pressure on the government, which makes 
them closely related to the perceived political threats set out in the Defence Study 07. Particular 
attention is given to the military threats that Norwegian contingencies may face in international 
operations abroad. Societal threats in Defence Study 07 are related to either asymmetrical threat 
resulting from international terrorism or other non-state actors’ activities, or to possible attacks 
on information and communication systems. The Defence Study 07 relates threats from 
economic sector to possible attacks or subversions without any physical destruction of state 
infrastructure, causing crisis that may result in the complete collapse of vital social functions like 
food supply, energy supply, payment system etc. Finally, ecological threats are not elaborated 
upon in the Defence Study 07. 
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Chapter 6: Differences and similarities between the Norwegian political and military elite in 
prioritising foundational elements and perception of external threats to them  
 
6.1 Order of priority of Foundational Elements 
 
6.1.1 The Idea of the State 
 
A comparison of absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of analysis indicates 
that while the idea of the state is the most commonly used foundational element (69 %) among 
three elements in the Defence Commission’s ‘A Strengthened Defence’, it is the least used 
element (25 %) in the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 2007’. This difference 
presented in absolute terms indicates that the political elite used the idea of the state almost ten 
times more than it was used by military elite (Table 6.1.1). 
 
The Idea of the State 
Defence Commission (N=138/201) Defence Study 07 (N=14/58) 
N 138 N 14 
% 69 % 25 
 
Table 6.1.1 Illustrates absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of how many 
times the idea of the state is considered in the Parliamentary Defence Policy Commission’s ‘A 
Strengthened Defence’ and the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 2007’. 
 
An analysis comparing the approaches of the political and military elite to the foundational 
elements indicates that an elaboration of the idea of the state is present in both documents, 
although these considerations are elaborated differently. In particularly, when it comes to the 
considerations related to the international aspects of the idea of Norwegian state (see Attachment 
1) this is more elaborated and prioritised by the political elite. In the military elite document, the 
Defence Study 07, this international aspect is considered within the framework of NATO 
membership and participation in international operations with allies. Thus, in the Defence Study 
07 most of the considerations on state sovereignty and Norwegian territorial integrity relate to 
the capability of dealing with challenges to sovereignty with own capacities, that is, until the 
outbreak of a full scale war against Norway, when Norway’s sovereignty would rely on the 
expected activation of the NATO principle of collective defence, with Norwegian Armed Forces 
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forming an integral part of Alliance. Deployment and cooperation of Norwegian Armed Forces 
with Allied soldiers within the international framework abroad led by NATO, the UN or other 
organizations, is in the Defence Study 07 considered as an important way of assuring that the 
Alliance will support Norway if necessary. The Defence Commission, on the other side, places 
great emphasis on the international aspects of the idea of the state, where Norway’s strong 
interests in the promotion and active contribution to maintaining international law, further 
development of the international society and respect for human rights is emphasised. Elaborating 
on several global challenges like migration, climate change, and weapons of mass destruction, 
and emphasising the collective nature of many challenges that Norway faces or may face, the 
Defence Commission stresses that small states such as Norway are more dependant on 
international cooperation and a functional international society than larger powers. Thus the 
Defence Commission underlines the Norwegian interests for credible, respected and efficient 
international organizations, in particular the UN and efficient regional organizations based on 
respect for human rights and the principles of the UN Charter. Membership in NATO’s 
collective defence system and cooperation with the EU in the security and defence area is 
considered as fundamental for Norwegian security and defence. With regard to a bilateral 
perspective, the political elite consider cooperation with Russia as particularly important, 
mentioning it five times more than cooperation with the USA. The Defence Commission also 
stressed that this is where Norway’s focus in efficient multilateralism should be directed, in 
active support to Russian constructive engagement in the international society, something which 
would contribute to make it easier to find a solution to the unsolved bilateral questions between 
Norway and Russia, and also result in improved confidence between the two states.  
 
6.1.2 The Institutions of the State 
 
With regard to the institutions of the state, a comparison of the absolute numbers shows that the 
term is used almost the same extent, while in percentage of relative distribution, the analysis 
indicates that institutions of the state is the most rarely used element (11 %) among three 
foundational elements in the Defence Commission’s ‘A Strengthened Defence’. By contrast, 
institutions of the state is the most often considered element (40 %) in Norwegian Chief of 
Defence’s ‘Defence Study 2007’ (Table 6.1.2). 
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The Institutions of the State 
Defence Commission (N=23/201) Defence Study 07 (N=24/58) 
N 23 N 24 
% 11 % 40 
 
Table 6.1.2 Illustrates absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of how many 
times the element ‘institutions of the state’ is considered in the Parliamentary Defence Policy 
Commission’s ‘A Strengthened Defence’ and the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 
2007’ 
 
When considering the references to the institutions of state as foundational element in percentage 
of relative distribution, the difference between the two documents studied is noticeable. The 
findings from the Defence Study 07 indicate that the military elite are focused on the governing 
regimes and their execution in line with Norwegian interests and international agreements. The 
political elite, on the other side, clearly stresses the founding values on which the Norwegian 
institutions are based, like democracy, justice in legal system, welfare state, human rights and 
security for every citizen in Norway. The political elite pay particular attention to the execution 
of jurisdiction in the northern parts of Norway, namely High North area, while in the case of 
challenges to state authority, the military elite place great importance on ensuring abilities of the 
government for political manoeuvre in ensuring political influence for Allied operation in 
defence of Norwegian territory. The political elite often employ regional and international 
perspectives on questions related to the High North area, particularly with regard to the national 
jurisdiction over islands around Svalbard and in the Barents Region. The political elite stressed 
the need for a predictable and responsible institutional policy as a precondition for the viable 
development and ensured stability and security in this area. The military elite, on the other hand, 
are concerned with the possible motives of other states that may try to advance their interest 
against Norway, potentially including limited use of force in order to impose additional pressure 
on the government to change its political course. The military elite thus conclude that the 
Norwegian military capabilities have to be able to ensure that any state, willing to use military 
force to advance its political interests against Norway, will not be able to achieve its goals 
without using such amounts of force will bring lead to Allied forces getting involved through the 
NATO doctrine of collective defence, even if the national interests of some of allies do not 
correspond to those of Norway.  
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6.1.3 The Physical Base of the State 
 
A comparison of absolute numbers indicates that the Defence Commission used this element 
twice as much as the ‘Defence Study 07’, while an analysis of percentage of relative distribution 
indicates that the physical base of the state as a foundational element is more frequently used in 
the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 2007’ (35 %) than in the Defence 
Commission’s ‘A Strengthened Defence’ (Table 6.1.3). 
 
The Physical Base of the State 
Defence Commission (N=40/201) Defence Study 07 (N=20/58) 
N 40 N 20 
% 20 % 35 
 
Table 6.1.3 Illustrates the absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of the number 
of times the physical base of the state is considered in the Parliamentary Defence Policy 
Commission’s ‘A Strengthened Defence’ and the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 
2007’ 
 
The political elite see the physical base of the state as consisting of the territorial integrity and 
population of Norway, including nationals outside of Norwegian borders who may be exposed to 
harassment or assault or be unable defend themselves. The physical base of the state in the 
Defence Study 07 is difficult to separate from defence matters as it assesses strategic targets on 
Norwegian territory through the perspective of the potential enemy’s political goals. The military 
elite concentrate on potential limited military attacks on Norwegian territory and asymmetric 
threats towards certain objects or important infrastructure. Protection and support of the civilian 
society on Norwegian territory, is in the Defence Study 07 based on the modernized concept of 
total defence. The military elite also refer to national interests in participation in international 
operations as being related to the need for Allied support of the protection of Norwegian 
territorial integrity. The political elite gives particular attention to the utilization of and control 
over state resources based on national sovereignty, international law and security in the High 
North area. 
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6.1.4 Summary of Foundational Elements 
 
The comparison of relative distribution related to the consideration of foundational elements in 
documents from both the military and political elite, indicates the highest difference in frequency 
of application of any of the elements is in the use of the idea of the state (69 % : 25 %).  For 
institutions of the state, the comparison of relative distribution shows that the Defence 
Commission used institutions of the state far less frequently than did the Defence Study 07 (11 
% : 40 %). The physical base of the state as a foundational element is, according to a comparison 
of relative distribution, less often used by the political elite than by the military elite (20% :35%) 
as illustrated in the table 6.1.4. 
 
Order of Priority for Foundational Elements 
                       Sources            
     Elements 
Defence Commission’s ‘A 
Strengthened Defence’ (N=201) 
Chief of Defence’s 
‘Defence Study 2007’ (N=58) 
The Idea of the State 69 % 25 % 
The Institutions of the 
State 
11 % 40 % 
The Physical Base of the 
State 
20 % 35 % 
Sum 100% 100% 
 
 
Table 6.1.4 Presents a comparison of percentages of relative distribution of how frequent the 
foundational elements are considered in the Parliamentary Defence Policy Commission’s ‘A 
Strengthened Defence’ and the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 2007’ 
 
Analysing the considerations of foundational elements by the political elite, it is clear that the 
idea of the state is most frequently considered and also most elaborated with detail among the 
foundational elements. As ‘national’ values characteristic of the Norwegian society and 
representing the foundations of Norwegian interest and focus of Norwegian identity and the idea 
of the state, the political elite considers the following: the value of living in peace, the welfare 
state, freedom and further development of democracy. The military elite, on the other hand, 
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predominantly relate the idea of the state to territorial integrity and the military-strategic 
situation in the area surrounding Norway, particularly the High North area. The military elite 
clearly emphasise the importance of being able to protect Norwegian interests, including the use 
of force, until the situation escalates into an armed conflict against Norway at which stage the 
NATO collective defence obligations should be activated. As to the international aspects of the 
idea of the state, this is something the political elite consider to be of high importance. Of 
particularly strong interest to Norway the political elite emphasise the promotion of international 
law and the contribution to active maintaining and further development of the international legal 
system, including the protection of human rights. Many of the challenges identified by political 
elite, are of a collective nature which impacts the majority of the international society (like 
proliferation of WMD, migrations, climate change, conflicts resolutions etc), and thus the 
political elite stress the Norwegian dependency on efficient international cooperation. According 
to the political elite, this is particularly important for small states like Norway as these states are 
more dependent on the effective functioning of the international cooperation than larger powers. 
It is therefore in the interest of Norway to support respected and efficient international 
organization like the UN and regional organizations which together present the foundation for 
world order based on respect for human rights and the principles of the UN Charter. The political 
elite consider membership in NATO and cooperation with the EU in the security and defence 
area to be important elements of a framework for Norwegian security and defence. The military 
elite consider that Norwegian sovereignty, in the case of an outbreak of war against Norway, 
would be dependant on the expected activation of the NATO principle of collective defence with 
Norwegian Armed Forces as an integral part of the Alliance. For the successful defence of 
Norway, the military elite emphasises the necessity of deployment and cooperation of 
Norwegian Armed Forces with Allied soldiers in the international framework. When considering 
tasks within the international framework, the military elite deals first with tasks within 
Norwegian territory and then in relation to military contribution to international operations 
abroad led by NATO, the UN or other organizations. The political elite consider interstate 
cooperation as a powerful and important means which Norway should use in the promotion of 
the international society. Cooperation with the USA in area of security and defence is considered 
by the political elite to be important and within the multilateral framework of NATO. Still, the 
political elite argues that Norwegian efforts towards efficient multilateralism should be focused 
on improving cooperation with Russia, through active support to Russian constructive 
engagement in international society, which would contribute to make it easier to find workable 
solutions to the unsolved bilateral questions between Norway and Russia and also the level of 
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confidence between the two states. For institutions of the state as the foundational element, the 
military elite focus on governing regimes in line with Norwegian interests and international 
agreements. Although considering institutions of the state less often, the political elite stressed 
the need for ensuring the effective functioning of the law and order in the state, justice in legal 
system and functioning of the society, and give particular attention to the effective execution of 
jurisdiction in the northern parts of Norway. The military elite consider that the possible goals of 
other state, in advancing its interests against Norway, may include limited use of force to impose 
additional pressure on government to change its political course. This is one of the main 
concerns of the military elite and in that respect, great importance is placed on the abilities of the 
government for political manoeuvre and political influence to ensure Allied operations in 
defence of Norwegian territory. Norway’s military capabilities, it is suggested in the Defence 
Study 07, have to be able to ensure that any state, willing to use military force to advance its 
political interests against Norway, will not be able to achieve its goals without using such levels 
of force that will result in NATO forces collectively defending Norway, even if the national 
interests of some allies do not correspond with Norwegian interests. With regard to the physical 
base of the state, the political elite considers this both more often and more detailed than 
institutions of the state, and predominantly relates the physical base to the territorial integrity and  
population of Norway. This includes nationals outside Norway’s borders that may be unable to 
defend themselves. The military elite considers the physical base to be related to Norway’s 
territorial integrity, excluding the risks of traditional military invasion and in stead focusing on 
the possibilities of limited violent episodes on Norwegian territory which may eventually 
escalate into a full scale war against Norway. Both the political and military elite consider the 
potentially most challenging scenarios to be related to the High North area, where complete 
control and utilization of resources is based on national sovereignty and international law. The 
political and military elite also consider potential challenges to personnel in international 
operations abroad in which Norway is participating. 
 
6.2 Perception of Threats from the External Environment  
 
6.2.1 Threats from the Military Sector 
 
A comparison of absolute numbers shows that threats from the military sector were mentioned in 
similar terms in both documents studied, while the analysis of percentage of relative distribution 
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indicates that these threats are far more frequently considered by the military (67 %) than by the 
political elite (Table 6.2.1). 
 
Threats from Military Sector 
Defence Commission (N=34/136) Defence Study 07 (N=14/58) 
N 34 N 41 
% 25 % 67 
 
Table 6.2.1 Illustrates the absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of how many 
times threats from military sector are considered in the Parliamentary Defence Policy 
Commission’s ‘A Strengthened Defence’ and the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 
2007’. 
 
Comparing the considerations on threat perception from the five different sectors, the political and 
military perspectives differ already from the beginning. It is noticeable that the political elite 
considers the current threat picture, which has changed as a consequence of globalization, big 
powers rivalry politics, climate change, migration, energy security, weak states and violent 
extremism, to be a starting point for identifying external influences on defining Norwegian 
security and defence policy. The military elite relate global threats from the military sector only to 
Norwegian contingencies in international operations abroad, particularly in the case of 
Afghanistan where Norway has a contingent. The political elite relates their perception of military 
threats, on the global scale, to low intensity conflicts in which Norwegian Armed Forces are 
participating, where limited, but repeated attacks on soldiers of international forces could occur 
during operations. The political elite also consider the potential for direct military threats that may 
eventually lead to limited air, sea or land attack against Norway being caused by Russian military 
activities in Barents Region, potential misunderstanding during day-to-day operations or even by a 
lack of mutual confidence leading to a limited military crises on the border with Russia. The 
military elite further elaborates on this, and considers more direct perspectives of military threats 
to state sovereignty and authority occurring, in the form of situations of crisis or critical conflicts 
possibly resulting in escalation into full scale war against Norway. These military threats are in the 
Defence Study 07 closely related to the achievement of enemy’s political goals, such as the 
pressuring the government to change its political course or to comply with some concrete demand. 
While the political elite consider the possibilities for a limited military attack on Norway, the 
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military elite is further elaborating on the different forms such military attacks on Norway may 
take. For instance, the military elite lists demonstrations of force and possible violation of 
Norwegian air, sea and land territory and the potential limited occupation of parts of Norwegian 
territory. Both the political and military elite see the High North area as the area where military 
threats are most likely. The political elite conclude that the increased Russian military activities in 
this area and potential misunderstandings or lack of mutual confidence may lead to limited 
military threats, while the military elite estimate, that in the case of confrontation, this area will 
represent an arena for demonstration of force in which the choice of military targets will be 
influenced by political intentions and will not necessarily reflect the traditional approach to 
strategic target evaluation.  
 
6.2.2 Threats from the Political Sector 
 
With regard to perceived threats coming from the political sector, the comparison of absolute 
numbers and relative terms percentage indicates that both the political (26 %) and military elite 
(16 %) to some extent consider these, but they are most frequently considered by political elite 
(Table 6.2.2). 
 
  Threats from Political Sector 
Defence Commission (N=35/136) Defence Study 07 (N=10/58) 
N 35 N 10 
% 26 % 16 
 
Table 6.2.2 Illustrates absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of how many 
times threats from the political sector are considered in the Parliamentary Defence Policy 
Commission’s ‘A Strengthened Defence’ and the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 
2007’. 
 
Threats from the political sector are considered by military elite to be closely related to different 
forms of military activities against Norwegian interests and accompanied by demonstrations of 
power aiming to assert political pressure on the government. The political elite, on the other 
hand, place high importance on the efficiency of multilateralism, and it sees the potential 
situations in which multilateralism may be diminished, or even paralysed, as a threat to 
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Norwegian interests. As the Norwegian right of utilization of resources in the parts of High 
North area is based in international law, a weakening of global multilateralism may have 
consequences for Norwegian sovereign rights. A further challenge to Norwegian jurisdiction 
identified by the political elite is the potentially self-asserting Russian foreign policy and the 
military importance of the High North area for Russia, combined with the unclear state borders 
between Norway and Russia. The continued importance of these aspects for the shaping of 
Norwegian security policy is stressed. The political elite further considers Norway’s dependence 
on NATO, identifying the institutional strength of NATO as important for Norway and 
Norwegian interests, while a weakening of NATO is considered very negative.  
 
6.2.3 Threats from the Societal Sector 
 
A comparison of absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution indicates that the 
political elite considered threats that fall within the societal sector more frequently than the 
military elite (Table 6.2.3). 
 
Threats from Societal Sector 
Defence Commission (N=31/136) Defence Study 07 (N=10/58) 
N 31 N 10 
% 23 % 16 
 
Table 6.2.3 Illustrates absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of how many 
times threats from societal sector are considered in the Parliamentary Defence Policy 
Commission’s ‘A Strengthened Defence’ and the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 
2007’ 
 
Both the political and military elite perceive international terrorism as the main source of societal 
threats. The Political elite have particular concerns for terrorist groups showing a desire for mass 
killings and for the possible danger of terrorism being connected with spreading and use of WMD. 
The military elite broadly connect societal threats to asymmetrical threats resulting from 
international terrorism or other non-state actors’ activities, but also consider terrorist activities as 
threats to important objects and infrastructure or information and communication systems in 
Norway to be a main concern. The military elite further consider as a threat to society serious 
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criminal activities which potentially may cause a crises in society. The political elite, on the other 
hand, besides stressing the threats from international terrorism, also relates the perception of 
societal threats to the maintaining of the welfare state (e.g. Norwegian management of resources 
and the environment).  
 
6.2.4 Threats from the Economic Sector 
 
A comparison of absolute numbers related to the perceived threats from the economic sector 
shows substantial differences between the two perspectives, in that the political elite considered 
these threats ten times more frequently. The percentage of relative distribution (7 %) shows the 
same result (Table 6.2.4). 
 
Threats from Economic Sector 
Defence Commission (N=10/136) Defence Study 07 (N=1/58) 
N 10 N 1 
% 7 % 1 
 
Table 6.2.4 Illustrates absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of how many 
times threats from the economic sector are considered in the Parliamentary Defence Policy 
Commission’s ‘A Strengthened Defence’ and the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 
2007’. 
 
Comparing the way in which threats from economic sector are considered, a substantial 
difference in perception in shown. The political elite relates most of the economic threats to 
international energy trade, in particular to the growing demand for energy resources, and focus 
on energy security with the potential consequences for Norway as exporter of energy resources. 
The military elite on the other hand, relates threats from the economic sector to possible attacks 
or subversions causing crisis or complete collapse in vital social functions like food supply, 
energy supply, payment system etc., without any physical destruction of state infrastructure. The 
military elite consider the possibility of potential paralysation of these functions in the case of 
destruction of vital information systems or manipulation of control systems on which the society 
depends. From a political elite perspective, the challenge to Norway may appear as consequence 
of external demands for a reduction of prices for energy resources, and also could be related to 
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international pressure for extended exploration in search for petroleum resources around 
Svalbard. As global importance of energy supplies makes energy infrastructure a valuable target 
for international terrorism, the political elite go on to consider the potential threat for Norwegian 
energy infrastructure. The political elite also relate the balance of state and public expenses in 
Norway as potentially challenging due to arising state expenses being caused by the aging 
population on one hand, and the potential long term decline of income from the petroleum 
industry potentially impacting on the development of the defence sector, on the other. 
 
6.2.5 Threats from the Ecological Sector 
 
An analysis of the compared absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of 
considered threats from the ecological sector elaborated by political elite, indicates that these are 
considered to certain extent (19 %), while it is not considered at all by the military elite (Table 
6.2.5). 
  
Threats from Ecologic Sector 
Defence Commission (N=26/136) Defence Study 07 (N=0/58) 
N 26 N 0 
% 19 % 0 
 
Table 6.2.5 Illustrates absolute numbers and percentage of relative distribution of how many 
times threats from the ecological sector are considered in the Parliamentary Defence Policy 
Commission’s ‘A Strengthened Defence’ and the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 
2007’. 
 
As is easily noticed when applying an analysis of absolute numbers and relative terms 
percentage to the Defence Study 07, ecological threats are not elaborated at all, and I will 
therefore go on to briefly elaborate on the political elite perception on these threats. These are 
considered to be of global or regional, but in any case of a significantly collective, character. The 
political elite considers both direct and indirect potential consequences of the global climate 
change and pollution, including the possible contribution to mass migrations and international 
conflicts based on the struggle for limited resources like water, food, more habitable territories, 
minerals and energy resources. Significant Arctic ice melting, which may lead to an increase in 
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the shipping traffic in the Arctic Sea, is considered by the political elite to add to threat picture, 
with the political, military and ecological challenges this may lead to. As areas where ecological 
threats may have a more direct impact on Norway’s security policy, the political elite mention 
the High North area and Barents region due to the possible destruction of fish stocks and 
environment. The political elite particularly stresses the importance of rescue missions required 
in the case of crisis caused by disasters and catastrophes both on the Norwegian territory and 
abroad when Norwegian citizens are involved. 
 
6.2.6 Summary of Perception of Threats from the External Environment  
 
The comparison of percentage of relative distribution related to possible threats from the 
external environment indicates a difference in how frequent such threats were considered from 
both the political and military elite side (Table 6.2.6). Threats from the military sector were in 
relative terms considered far more frequently by the military elite (67 %: 25 %) than by the 
political elite. 
A comparison of the percentage of relative distribution related to perceived threats from the 
political, societal, and economic sectors, shows that both the political and military elite consider 
them to some extent. All of the threats from these sectors are most frequently considered by 
political elite.  
 
Perception of Threats from the External Environment 
                       Sources            
     Sectors 
Defence Commission’s ‘A 
Strengthened Defence’ (N=136) 
Chief of Defence’s 
‘Defence Study 2007’ (N=61) 
Military    25 % 67 % 
Political 26 % 16 % 
Societal 23 % 16 % 
Economic 7 % 1 % 
Ecological 19 % 0 % 
Sum 100 % 100 % 
 
Table 6.2.6 Illustrates relative percentage distribution of how many times threats from the 
external environment are considered in the Parliamentary Defence Policy Commission’s ‘A 
Strengthened Defence’ and the Norwegian Chief of Defence’s ‘Defence Study 2007’ 
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With regard to the political elite, the starting point for comparing their perception of threats is the 
broad consideration of consequences of globalization, big powers’ politics of rivalry, climate 
change, migration, energy security, weak states and violent extremism, the influence of which is 
argued to important when defining a Norwegian policy of defence and security . The military elite, 
on the other hand, mainly focus on perceived threats related to interstate conflict, state sovereignty 
and state authority, and crises management in critical conflict situations. The potential for direct 
military threats is by the political elite related to Russian military activities in Barents Region. The 
political elite consider these threats to potentially involve limited air, sea or land attacks against 
Norway. The military elite perceives military threats to come from demonstrations of force and 
possible violation of Norwegian air, sea and land territory with a accompanying potential for 
limited occupation of parts of Norway’s territory. The military elite emphasise that there is a close 
relationship between threats from the military sector with the opponent’s attempt to achieve its 
political goals, such as pressuring the Norwegian government to change its political course or to 
comply with some concrete demands. Similarly to political elite, the military elite consider the 
potential for direct military threats to be greatest in the High North area. With regard to 
perceptions of military threats on the global scale, the political elite focus on low intensity 
conflicts in which Norwegian Armed Forces may become involved, and where limited, but 
repeated attacks on soldiers from international forces could occur during operations. The military 
elite pay particular attention to military threats which may strike Norwegian contingents in 
international operations outside Norway, such as Afghanistan.  
Most of the threats from the political sector are considered by the political elite to be connected to 
the importance and efficiency of multilateralism for Norway and the potential situations in which 
this may be diminished, or even paralysed. As the Norwegian right of utilization of resources in 
parts of the High North area is based in international law, the Defence Commission consider the 
consequences of a potential weakening of multilateralism to be a challenge to Norway’s sovereign 
rights in High North area. The military elite see most potential military threats to be connected to 
the possible political threats and plans for political achievement by other states,  for instance in the 
form of demonstrations of power with the aim of asserting political pressure on the government. 
This interconnection between military and political threats makes it difficult to separate the 
military elite’s approach to political threats from that of perceived military threats. The political 
elite focus on the self-asserting Russian foreign policy and the military importance of the High 
North area for Russia. Stressing the continued importance of the institutional strength of NATO 
for Norwegian security policy, the political elite consider a strong NATO to be an important 
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Norwegian interest. On the other hand, the Defence Study 07 stresses the importance of the 
military capabilities of the Norwegian Armed Forces to protect Norway from politically motivated 
military threats from another state, until the level of force used against Norway becomes 
unacceptable and leads to the involvement of allies, irrespective of their different political 
perspectives.  The political elite distinguish threats from the societal sector from those related to 
maintaining the welfare state, particularly with regard to resources and environment and threats 
related to international terrorism. Of particular concern to the political elite does the threat posed 
by terrorist groups want to cause mass killings or to spread and use WMD that these may acquire. 
In the Defence Study 07, societal threats are related to either asymmetrical threats caused by 
international terrorism or other activities by non-state actors, or to attacks on information and 
communication systems. The impact of serious criminal activities, potential crisis in society, and 
particularly terrorist activities towards important objects and infrastructure, is considered by the 
military elite to represent some of the main considerations of threats to the security of the society. 
While the political elite relates the majority of economic threats to Norway to international 
energy trade caused by the growing demand for energy resources and increased focus on energy 
security, the military elite relates such threats from economic sector to the possibilities of crisis 
situations in Norway, such as disruptions or sabotages that may cause complete collapse in vital 
social functions like food supply, energy supply, payment system etc. without physical 
destruction of state infrastructure. The political elite conclude that the increased importance of 
energy supply may cause Norwegian energy infrastructure to become a valuable target of 
international terrorism. Further, emphasis is places on potential difficulties in maintaining a 
balance between state and public expenses in Norway due to growing state expenses caused by 
the aging population on one hand, and a potential long term decline of income from the 
petroleum industry, with the potential detrimental effect this may have on the development of the 
defence sector, on the other.  
The majority of ecological threats identified and assessed by the political elite has either a global 
or a regional form, and do to a significant extent have a collective character for the international 
society. The Defence Study 07, however, does not consider ecological threats. The political elite 
expect both potential direct and indirect consequences from the impact of global climate change 
and pollution, with possible threats affecting all five sectors. Climate change may in this context 
contribute to mass migrations and international conflicts based on the struggle for limited 
resources. Potential areas where ecological threats may have a more direct impact on Norway’s 
security policy are identified as being the High North area and Barents region. In the case of 
significant Arctic ice melting and the resulting multiplying of shipping traffic in the Arctic Sea, 
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the political elite considers this to have an impact on the security policy of Norway. The political 
elite also consider potential crisis caused by disasters or catastrophes on the Norwegian territory 
and abroad when Norwegian citizens are involved, that will require rescue actions. 
 
6.3 The Bottom Line 
 
This chapter presented a comparison of findings related to the answers to the questions on how 
Norwegian political and military elite prioritize foundational elements of the state, and how they 
interpret the external environment. The political elite consider the idea of the state most often 
and as the most important foundational element, giving particular attention to Norway’s 
membership and contribution to the development of the international society through the 
promotion peace, welfare state, freedom and democracy. The military elite relate considerations 
of sovereignty to the military-strategic situation in Norway and the surrounding areas. The most 
frequent and detailed consideration is by the military elite is of the institutional expression of the 
state, with focus on the governing regimes and their execution in accordance with Norwegian 
interests and international agreements. The mapping of perceived threats from the external 
environment reveals that threats from the military, political, societal and economic sectors are all 
elaborated upon, although to a certain extent in different ways, both by the political and the 
military elite, with exception to threats from the ecological sector, which are not elaborated in 
Defence Study 07. 
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Chapter 7: Summarizing the Strategic Culture in Norway 
 
By returning to the central conceptual framework of the thesis, my aim in this chapter is to 
consider the problems set out in the four key questions posed in the introduction in relation to the 
findings on political and military elite strategic considerations explored, presented and compared 
in chapters 4-6. The first set of questions concerns the order of priority given to the foundational 
elements of the state: How do the Norwegian political and military elite prioritize foundational 
elements? The second set is related to the interpretation of the external environment: How do the 
Norwegian political and military elite interpret the external environment? Then I will relate the 
findings or outcome of the answers to the initial questions to the theoretical framework of 
strategic culture, presenting how close we are to understanding the Norwegian strategic culture 
after this journey through current security policy considerations of the Norwegian political and 
military elites. 
 
7.1 Identifying Norway’s Foundational Elements 
 
The first foundational element, related to the idea of the state, indicates that the political elite has 
broader, more global perception and approach than the military. The findings indicate that the 
political side is likely to be willing to use force for a broader set of purposes than the military 
side. As presented in chapter 6, the idea of the state is considered by both sides, but the military 
perception of the idea of the state is predominantly focused on state sovereignty and Norwegian 
interests on the Norwegian territory. As put in forward in Chapter 5, the military perception of 
the idea of the state is often difficult to distinguish from state’s physical base and the functioning 
logic of its governing institutions. On the other hand, the political perceptions expressed by the 
Defence Commission include aspects which are not considered in the Defence Study 07. This 
takes us back to chapter 4 where it was presented that Norwegian interests are based on the ideal 
of advancing founding values of UN efforts in achieving universal respect for human rights and 
advancing peaceful development in the world. This aspect is illustrated by the Defence 
Commission by the obligation Norway, together with other states, has to stop conflicts and 
relieve humanitarian emergencies in accordance with the UN principle of Responsibility to 
Protect. Thus, the political side widens the set of security policy options by relating them to the 
international expectations for Norwegian participation in international operations and burden-
sharing on collective security between allies. These considerations are then translated into 
observable policies comprising of governing premises, which represent strategic and political 
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parameters governing the defence of Norway. Among the governing premises related to the idea 
of the state than, the political side include the commitment to external expectations from allies 
which forms the framework for decisions and actions with regard to the use of force. 
Furthermore, when alignment is considered, the military side more often refers to Norway’s 
‘allies’, while the Defence Commission expresses concerns about the future of NATO and 
indicates a perception that the role of European Security and Defence Policy is of increasing 
importance to Norwegian security and defence policy.  
 
As suggested, all these findings indicate that the political side is likely to be willing to use force 
for a broader set of purposes than the military side. The political side broadens the repertoire of 
security policy options by relating them to the international expectations for Norwegian active 
participation in collective security and in defending the values of the international society. On 
the other hand, the military dominantly relates concerns to state sovereignty and Norwegian 
interests in the Norwegian territory, relating them closely to state’s physical base and execution 
of authority of governing institutions. Even participation in international operations is considered 
by the military side to be one of the premises for further developing the Norwegian Armed 
Forces to ensuring the ability of the Norwegian government to exercise authority over the 
Norwegian territory and protect freedom of movement in the surrounding areas. 
 
Strategic considerations of the political and military elite related to the second foundational 
element, shows a different approach to the institutional expression of the state. On the political 
side, there is more concern for the functioning authority of the state as a provider of law, order 
and justice, based on responsible and predictable policies. The focus of the military elite, on the 
other hand, is more related to governing regimes and the execution of state authority in 
accordance with Norwegian interests. The Defence Commission on the political side, bases state 
authority and the functioning of institutions on the respect and promotion of values like 
democracy, human rights, justice in legal system, and the maintaining of the welfare state and 
security of every citizen in Norway. Furthermore, the political elite particularly stressed the 
importance of support and contribution to the international society and the strengthening of 
multilateralism based on the respect for international law and the principles of the UN Charter. 
And when elaborating on challenges for Norway in the High North area with regard to 
neighbouring Russia and the need to protect certain Norwegian interests in the area, the Defence 
Commission relates these to the strong belief in the power of multilateralism. Norwegian support 
to a constructive Russian engagement in the international society is thus considered to be a 
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significant contribution to improved mutual confidence and improved chances of solving the 
bilateral questions between Norway and Russia related to Norwegian interests in the High North 
area. 
The preference expressed by the military elite, on the other hand, is to consider the potentially 
different implications for maintaining state authority in all parts of Norway. Furthermore, the 
military elite point to the necessity of continued appreciation of the risk of potential use of force 
against Norway as a means to assert additional pressure on the government to change its political 
course, something which may eventually escalate into a full scale war. The expressed ambition 
for the capabilities of military forces, as presented by the military side, is thus to ensure the 
ability of the government to politically influence the allies to commit their forces to a defence 
operation on Norwegian territory. In other words, the military side considers that capacities 
required in respect of Norwegian forces, is whatever is sufficient to prevent any other state to 
advance its political interests against Norway below the level of violence that would be 
unacceptable and thus bring Allied forces to the collective defence of Norway, even if the 
national interests of some those allies not necessarily corresponds to those of Norway.  
 
These findings indicate that the political side considers as most important the functioning 
authority of the state as a provider of law, order and justice, and thus may be more concerned 
with the legal aspects of use of force, despite being more willing to use force for a broader set of 
purposes as presented earlier. The military side, being mainly concerned with the execution of 
the governing regimes and state authority to the whole territory, is more concerned with the 
ability of the Norwegian Armed Forces to secure the authority of the national government and 
freedom of movement on the entire Norwegian territory and, in situations of crisis, the 
surrounding areas. 
 
Finally, as presented in Chapter 2, the physical base of the state presents the most concrete of the 
three components in the model. The comparison of relative terms in chapter 6 showed that the 
military side considers the physical base of the state much more frequently than the political 
side. While the military side is mainly concerned with the territorial integrity of Norway, the 
political side is more concerned with the complex picture of the physical base including the right 
of utilising resources in Norwegian territories and the protection of Norwegian citizens outside 
Norway who may be exposed to harassment or assault or be unable defend themselves. The 
military elite predominantly relate the considerations of the physical base of the state to an 
assessment of potential strategic targets on Norwegian territory the attack on which would 
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support the achievement of the enemy’s political goals, such as military infrastructure. The 
Norwegian territory seen in this way may present an arena for demonstration of military power 
in the airspace, on the land and at sea, as considered in the Defence Study 07. The protection of 
Norwegian population outside of Norway who may be exposed to life-threatening situations is 
only considered by the military elite in relation to international peace operations. By contrast, the 
political side gives particular attention to the safety and security of the population both in and 
outside Norwegian territory. Furthermore, the Defence Commission is concerned about the 
unobstructed utilization of state resources the complete control of which is subject to national 
sovereignty, international law and the overall security in the High North area. 
 
These findings indicate that the political side may be more likely to consider using the 
Norwegian Armed Forces in cases when Norwegian citizens are in danger and unable to defend 
themselves or struck by natural catastrophes, both in Norway and also outside the state borders. 
As was seen when presenting the idea of the state, the political side is willing to consider a wider 
set of goals and purposes for using force both in Norway and abroad. The military side would 
more often consider the physical base of the state but predominantly within the context of 
Norwegian territory and in defence of Norwegian territorial integrity.    
 
7.2 Perception of the External Environment 
 
The second set of questions related to exploring the interpretation of the external environment 
from perspectives of the political and military elites. These two aspects were studied through the 
lenses of Barry Buzan’s analysis of the problem of national security which proved to be a solid 
starting point for the development of a the research design intended to examine the relation 
between the perspectives on the external environment of the state’s political and military elites. 
Chapter 2 proposed that military, political, economic, societal and ecological sectors from which 
threats from external environment can be perceived, represent a model for the research of the 
external environment, or more precisely, of the political and military elites’ perception of threat. 
This approach facilitates a mapping of perceived threats from the external environment which 
already from the initial point revealed differences in perception of threats from the external 
environment.  
The political side has broader perception on potential sources of threats on the global scale. 
Political representatives consider consequences of globalization, big powers politics of rivalry, 
climate change, migration, energy security, weak states and violent extremism as important 
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elements of defining and deciding upon a Norwegian security and defence policy. This 
seemingly more collective security agenda of the political elite differs from the perception of the 
military elite.  
 
Threats from the Military Sector 
 
When considering the perception of threat from the military side, the main conclusion is that 
threats from the military sector to Norway are dominant and are of a limited form. As seen in 
chapters 5 and 6, the military side relates threats from the military sector predominantly to the 
Norwegian area and national sovereignty. The majority of these threats are related to potential 
episodes of limited attacks on Norway and situations of crisis management which may 
eventually escalate into a full scale conflict. The political side considers direct military threats to 
state sovereignty, relating these to neighbouring Russia. But the findings indicate that threats 
from military sector are perceived not only differently dominant, but also differently perceived in 
spatial dimension, in their nearness to Norwegian territory. As presented in chapters 4-6, the 
political side relates most of the perceived threats from the military sector to international 
operations outside state borders and to participating Norwegian contingent, while the military 
side relates them mainly to the Norwegian area, where demonstrations of power and conflicts are 
not excluded.  
 
 Threats from the Political Sector 
 
The comparison of perceived threats from the political sector indicates that there are different 
perceptions between the political and military sides. While the military side perceives most 
threats to be related to Norwegian territory and neighbouring Russia in the form of military 
threats the political side focuses on threats from the political sector. The main difference between 
these approaches is the relation perceived between the dominant perception of political threats 
and the consequences of a potential weakening of global multilateralism. The political side links 
this to the potential challenges to Norway’s sovereign rights in High North area adding here the 
potentially self-asserting Russian foreign policy and the unclear state borders between Norway 
and Russia in this area. As presented in chapter 5, the military elite consider most of the 
perceived military threats to be a function of political actions of other states, linking closely the 
perceived political threats to the spectrum of military threats against Norway. The majority of the 
political threats considered by the military elite are related to the potential attempts by other state 
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to change the Norwegian government’s political course or to comply with some concrete 
demands, main in relation to the High North area. This difference indicates that political side 
may be more concerned with legal aspects relating the perceived political threats to international 
law, and relying more on efficient global multilateralism. The military, on the other hand, relates 
political threats closely to the dominating perceived threats from the military sector, something 
which indicates that the reliance on the military capacities is seen as inseparable from the 
handling of these threats. 
 
Threats from the Economic Sector 
 
The main difference between the political and military perceptions of threats coming from the 
economic sector is in the perspective from which these are considered. The political side has a 
more international perspective, considering the potential consequences of threats to the energy 
market, while the military is more concerned with the direct impact of potential destruction of 
vital information systems or manipulation of control systems which may paralyze society. Thus 
the considerations of the political elite with regard to economic threats are related to the growing 
demand for energy resources and a focus on energy security with possible corresponding threats 
to the political sector. These may appear as a consequence of increased external demand for 
reduction of prices for energy resources, and secondly, from international pressure to extend 
exploration for petroleum resources around Svalbard. The potential consequences of economic 
threats perceived by the military elite are of a more physical form, like a complete collapse in 
vital functions for society such as food supply, energy supply, and payment system etc. due to 
the possible destruction of vital information systems or manipulation of control systems.  
 
Threats from the Societal Sector 
 
Military and political considerations of threats from the societal sector do not represent 
significant differences. The political and military elites both relate threats to the society with 
international terrorism and the desire of some groups for mass killings, and both sides see the 
possible connection of such groups with the spreading and use of weapons of mass destruction as 
an even greater danger. 
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Threats from the Ecological Sector 
 
The majority of ecological threats identified and assessed by political elite has either a global or 
a regional element, and are to a significant extent of a collective character for the international 
society, while these threats are not elaborated on by the military side. The Defence Commission 
considers the crossover effects these threats may on all other threat sectors in the long term 
perspective. Direct and indirect potential consequences may appear due to global climate change 
and pollution which can contribute to mass migrations and international conflicts as presented in 
chapters 4 and 6. Potential crises caused by disasters and catastrophes, which may require rescue 
actions, are considered by the political elite both at a national level, but also in other states, when 
Norwegian citizens are involved. 
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      Chapter 8: Overall Conclusion of the Thesis and Suggestions for further research 
 
 
In my conclusions, I will take an overall look at Norway through the perspective of the 
presented research model. The study examined the priorities and perceptions of the 
Norwegian political and military elite with regard to preferences for security policy choice 
and the use of force. The way in which the concept of strategic culture was mobilised in this 
thesis enabled a close insight into the strategic considerations of the Norwegian political and 
military elites as referents of strategic culture. I have concluded that there is in Norway two 
substantially different strategic cultures existing among the political and military elites. By 
succeeding in the aim to uncover dominant perceptions and considerations of the referents of 
strategic culture in the case of Norway, this study represents a contribution to the conceptual 
foundations of strategic culture whose explanatory and research powers are still being 
questioned. The main elements of the strategic culture model through which these 
preferences were examined in this thesis, are the perception of the state through its 
foundational elements and the perception of the external environment through five different 
sectors of threats.  
By returning to the conceptual concerns of this study, my aim in this chapter is to shed light 
on the different priorities and perceptions of political and military elite that may have an 
impact on decision-making related to use of force and on formulation of security policies. 
Examining the priority given to foundational elements of the state, I have concluded that the 
political elite broadens the range of security policy options and is likely to be willing to use 
force for a broader set of purposes than the military elite. By relating the use of force to the 
international expectations of active Norwegian participation in defending values of the 
international society, it can be said that political elite seems more competent to consider 
whether to or not to deploy Norwegian troops in international operations and to consider the 
legal aspect of the use of force. The military elite’s main concerns for territorial integrity and 
the execution of authority indicates a greater interest for having the needed military 
capacities to defend Norway’s stance in surrounding areas and Norway’s specific interests.  
In the quest for an analytic agenda through which to examine the perception of the external 
environment, I applied the approach whereby sectors of economic, societal and ecological 
security issues appear alongside the political and military issues. Each of these sectors 
provided an insight into the considerations of the political and military elites on perceptions 
of threats from the external environment. At the same time, the sectors illustrated perceptions 
  
81         
  
 
 
            
          
 
 
 
of the elites which may be likely to influence considerations and decision making on the use 
of force. The military elite dominantly perceive threats from military sector while political 
elite as mainly perceive threats from the political sector. Within the threat perception of the 
political elite, most of threats from other sectors are considered to have crossover effects to 
the political sector, reflecting a broader perception of potential sources of threats on the 
global scale. 
On the basis of these considerations, it can be asserted that Norwegian strategic culture lacks 
coherence when the considerations and perceptions of the political and military elite are 
compared. Although the necessity for cooperation and deployment in the international 
framework, thereby strengthening the multilateralism as a strong Norwegian interest, is likely 
to continue to have a decisive impact on thinking on the use of force within Norwegian 
political and military elite, there may appear to a certain extent to be a contradictory 
influence on the choice of priorities when policies on security and defence are decided upon. 
The presented findings on the different preferences for the use of force between the two 
elites, lead to a concern of the potential outcome of one of these two considerations 
significantly prevailing. What impacts may appear if the priorities and perceptions of one of 
these two sides are not considered to the extent expected? What if the priorities and 
perceptions of the Defence Commission were given advantage? What if the priorities and 
perceptions of the Chief of Defence were given advantage? How and to what extent may this 
impact on shaping the decision making by the Government, which through its political 
representatives reflects the values of society with regard to the use of force? Which 
preferences would the Government’s strategic culture reveal in such as case? Or if we return 
back to conceptual concerns from chapter 1, related to regulatory practice and to the 
implementation of the chosen security and defence policy, a hypothetical question may be 
posed on how the Norwegian Armed Forces will implement the security and defence policy 
if the decision making is far more influenced by the Defence Commission? 
       
Suggestions for further research 
 
The way in which the concept of strategic culture was mobilised in this thesis enables that the 
outcome of the reports from the Defence Commission and the Chief of Defence, the 
Parliamentary White Paper (Storingetsproposisjon) on long-term planning of security and 
defence policy, can be examined and compared with each of these two reports respectively. 
As suggested already in chapter 3, the reports that were used as primary sources in this study, 
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have the same purpose. As these contribute to the formulation of security and defence policy, 
such a comparison may reveal if one of the two documents is given a higher priority, 
something which may give a clearer insight into which strategic culture is the more 
dominant. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
1. Categorization related to the state Foundational Elements 
 
1.1 Political elite - Foundational Elements 
 
a) The idea of the state 
• Norwegian state sovereignty and sovereign rights    
• Peace and security for the state and the society 
• Protection and advancing national values and interests     
• Freedom and further development of democracy 
• Protection of basis for welfare state for society   
• Promoting respect for human rights  
• Promoting International Law    
• Cooperation through UN and peaceful development in the world   
• Contribution to International Peace Support Operations    
• Promoting International Society     
• NATO membership  
• Global Disarmament Process   
• Cooperation with EU    
• Cooperation with USA    
• Cooperation with Russia    
• Cooperation with Nordic States    
 
b) The institutions of the state 
• Law and order in the state    
• Justice in legal system    
• Functional jurisdictional authority in the state     
• Responsible policy and state authority in the High North area   
• Deterring pressure on the government    
• National monitoring grounds for decision-making     
• Jurisdiction and control in Fishery protection zone (Fiskevernsonen)    
• Total defence concept   
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• Integration policy   
 
c) The physical base of the state 
• Territorial integrity of Norway    
• Security for state and population     
• Rights for utilisation of resources and security in the High North area    
• Safety for nationals in the state    
• Safety for nationals outside the state      
• Complete control of state resources like oil, gas and fish       
• Safeguard of state borders and objects      
• Safeguard of state resources and environment      
• Energy infrastructure and supplying      
• Nature and fish stocks in the seas     
• Defence industry     
 
1.2 Military elite - Foundational Elements 
 
d) The idea of the state 
• State sovereignty     
• Political rationale and objectives    
• Norwegian interests         
• NATO membership          
 
e) The institutions of the state 
• Government and governing regimes in line with Norwegian interests and 
International agreements   
• Execution of the state authority       
• Monitoring and situational awareness for decision making       
• Managing the resources from Norwegian sea territory         
• Vital information functions of society   
• Total Defence concept      
 
 
  
85         
  
 
 
            
          
 
 
 
f) The physical base of the state 
• Norwegian territory: airspace, land, national sea waters, as potential arena for 
military power demonstrations        
• Society with main functions ensured    
• High North area    
• Economic infrastructure    
• Military infrastructure    
• Information and telecommunications infrastructure    
• Border control towards Russia    
• Military capacities in NATO-led international operations abroad  
 
 
2. Example of categorization related to the threat perception of the external environment 
 
2.1 Political elite threat perception of the external environment 
 
a) Military threats 
• Low intensity conflicts and threats to participating Norwegian contingency in UN, 
NATO or EU led international operations       
• Asymmetric threats in international operations in intrastate conflicts, manifested 
through repeated attacks on military and civilian officers  
• Physical threats to basis of welfare state   
• Armed conflicts – risk of war not excluded even in Europe      
• Complex security situation in the High North area       
• Military importance of High North area for Russia          
• Russian policy towards neighbouring countries and increasing military activities 
in border zone        
• Russian military activities in border zone  
• Limited military threat as consequence of misunderstanding or lack of mutual 
confidence between Norwegian and Russian military forces  
• Direct threats to state sovereignty       
• Unclear borderlines with Russia         
• Limited military attack on Norway   
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b) Political threats 
• Consequences of large powers rivalry politics    
• Diminishing of International Law and International cooperation  
• Consequences of globalization and global migrations    
• Weak states, violent extremism and intrastate conflicts     
• Potential spreading of conflicts and instability globally and regionally    
• Complex security policy situation related to neighbouring Russia    
• Complex security situation related to High North area    
• Different perception of other states on Svalbard status    
• Weakening of NATO’s role 
• Potential multiplying of shipping in the North sea– challenges to state authority  
 
c) Societal threats 
• Limit to the right to use resources in High North threatening welfare state  
• International terrorism    
• Computer generated attack on important society’s information systems   
• Spreading of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
• Terrorists activities that could threaten Norwegian citizens abroad 
 
d) Economic threats 
• Energy security – long term disruption of energy supplying  
• Raising competition over the scarce resources (e.g. worsening situation on the 
Middle East)             
• Global critical competition for energy resources may change export conditions for 
Norway under pressure  
• Reduced income from petroleum industry due to the limit on right to use 
resources in High North  
• Lack of energy resources on the global scale that may lead to potential 
international pressure for more intensive exploration activity in the High North 
area     
• Pressure on Norway to change export conditions for oil and natural gas due to 
critical global competition for energy resources 
• Terrorist attacks directed to energy supplying in area of Norway   
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• Balance of state expenses in situation of declining incomes from petroleum 
industry and  aging population    
 
e) Ecological threats 
• Global climate change and pollution           
• Uncontrolled migrations to more habitable areas due to climate change    
• Struggle among nations for scarce resources like oil, natural gas and minerals 
• Struggle among nations for potentially limited natural resources like water or food    
• Natural catastrophes abroad where Norwegian citizens could be involved    
• Faster reduction of some species   
• Arctic ice melting and ecological challenges due to potential multiplying of 
shipping in the North Sea      
• Nature and fish population destruction in the seas around Norway 
• Natural catastrophes in Norway     
• Accidents and rescue situations  in Norway  
 
2.2 Military elite threat perception of the external environment 
 
a) Threats from military sector 
• Threat to Norwegian sovereignty and authority through demonstrations of 
force and violation of Norwegian air, sea and land territory     
• Force demonstration against Norway in the form of air, navy or land forces 
raids   
• Partial territory occupation of Norway 
• Escalation of crises and collective defence of Norway    
• Navy vessels confrontation   
• Threat to Norwegian interests that can escalate to armed conflict   
• Conflict in Norwegian area as a result of regional political disputes    
• Security threats in High North area that might have to be faced without 
support from allies    
• Aircraft or missile attack on vital military or economic infrastructure 
• Norwegian contingencies in international operations abroad        
• Armed conflict in Afghanistan     
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• Isolated and limited use of force against Norway for achieving limited 
political objectives         
• Asymmetric threats in Norway and off-shore infrastructure    
 
b) Political threats 
• Weak and failed states and societies, collapsed or in conflicts that may put 
pressure on government to react   
• Threat to security in High North area    
• States that pursue their interests threatening with use of force against Norway 
• Pressure against the government to change its political course    
 
c) Societal threats 
• International terrorism    
• Asymmetric threats from non-state actors    
• Attack on vital information structures like payment system etc.    
• Serious criminal activities threatening to the security of the society    
 
d) Economic threats 
• Sabotage on some vital societies functions like food and energy supplies    
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